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DURESS BY ECONOMIC PRESSURE II*
JoHN DALZELL**
This paper has been concerned with the growing readiness of our
courts to treat economic pressure (and some other non-physical pres-
sures) as duress, having the same effect on the rights of the parties as
the cruder form of duress recognized by Blackstone. The thesis, as
stated at the outset,12 8 has been that the essentials of all duress are,
(1) a wrongful threat, in such circumstances that, (2) the victim would
not have any effective legal remedy, effective either for prevention of the
wrong or to secure sufficient redress if the threat were carried out. The
cases involving threats of actionable wrongs, such as the threat to break
a contract, have been discussed in the first part of the article already
published. The cases that have not yet been taken up, then, for the
most part, involve threats to do something which would not be an action-
able wrong; in most of these cases, that is, even if the person voicing the
threat should carry it out, the victim would not have suffered any injury
cognizable at law. The first group of cases to be taken up here does
include some, however, in which the execution of the threat would have
involved liability in tort.
H. THREAT OF INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTURAL RELATIONS,
PRESENT OR PROSPECTIVE, BETWEEN VICTIM AND THIRD PARTY
A threat to induce a third party to refuse performance of a con-
tractual promise is often an effective means of putting pressure on the
promisee.
After Schiffer had bought a half interest in a mining property from
Adams, he had to pay Adams' son $10,000 to get a release of the son's.
invalid and probably fraudulent claim to the property. The vendor-
father apparently was neither legally nor morally responsible for the
assertion of this claim; but Schiffer demanded partial reimbursement
from Adams senior, and backed his demand with the threat to withhold
the father's $8,000 deposit in a bank controlled by a firm of which
Schiffer was a partner. During the four months' negotiation with Adams
junior for a quitclaim deed, Schiffer had already succeeded in pre-
venting withdrawals from the father's account, except for necessary
living expenses. Adams finally accepted a settlement proposition from
* The first part of this article, published in the April issue (1942) 20 N. C. L.
Rsv. 237, will be referred to hereafter in the notes simply as "Part I." with a
specific number for the page to which cross reference is made.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.1' Part I, 240.
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Schiffer, surrendering $2,500 from the bank deposit and also releasing
a $6,000 contingent interest which Adams still held under the original
contract of sale to Schiffer. This transaction was successfully attacked
for duress in an action by Adams. The plaintiff cited and the court
relied on the cases on duress of goods12 9 and said the settlement with
Schiffer was "clearly made under duress of property"; that what was
threatened was
".. . not a mere withholding of a debt due from [Schiffer] himself, but
an unlawful interference between the plaintiff and other debtors, by
means of which he stopped the payment to plaintiff of sums due him;
"130
There was here certainly no duress of goods in the ordinary meaning of
that phrase, for the bank deposit did not make the banker a bailee of
Adams' money; there was simply a debtor-creditor relation established,
as the court expressly admitted on the same page from which the above
language was quoted. Schiffer's threat was to induce a third party, here
the bank, to disregard its contract with Adams, and the decision treats
resort to that threat as duress. 13 ' There is no discussion of the remedies
that might be available to Adams.
Another decision points in the same direction. The action was to
collect royalties under an agreement licensing the use of certain patent
rights in the erection of a commercial garage building. The licensing
agreement was signed after the construction of the building had begun;
the plaintiff-patentee appeared, alleged the erection was an infringement
of its patent rights, and threatened to persuade the mortgagee to withhold
funds needed for the building. The mortgagee did refuse to supply
funds, the erection project was about to stop, and defendants were in
danger of bankruptcy, when they surrendered to plaintiff's demands by
signing the license-contract. The court held a cross complaint alleging
these facts, and denying any projected patent infringement, was good
against demurrer, but gave no reasons for their decision other than a
1" Part I, 241.
... Adams v. Schiffer ct al., 11 Colo. 15, 17 Pac. 27 (1888).
131 This decision should have been cited in Part I in discussing the threat to
break a contract as duress. The court, elsewhere in the same opinion, rejected a
claim of Adams for rescission of another transaction with Schiffer, saying that a
threat to break a contract cannot be duress, 11 Colo. 15, 32, 17 Pac. 21, 30 (1888) ;
and the language quoted from the decision in the text above makes the same dis-
tinction. In other words, if the bank had threatened to withhold Adams' money,
that would not have been duress; but the threat of a third party to induce the
bank to act thus is duress! If there is any difference the former threat should be
treated as a stronger -basis for a claim of duress than the latter. The threat of
the contracting party, the bank itself, is both more wrongful than the threat of a
third party who is not bound on the contract, and also more powerful, because the
third party cannot bring any force to bear on his victim except by persuading
another individual.
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reference to the doctrine of "business-compulsion." 132 In another case,
the Michigan court decided that an account settlement forced by-threats
of the debtor to interfere, possibly by garnishment proceedings, with
payments due to the creditor-victim from other debtors, was voidable
for duress. 33
The cases just referred to have involved threats to interfere with an
existing contract right; several claims of duress have been based on a
threat to interfere with prospective contracts with other parties. Among
these, the strongest case for -duress was made where a bank threatened
to ruin the plaintiff's credit with other banks in the community, a threat
which apparently could have been carried out effectively under the rela-
tions existing between the local banks. Under this pressure the plaintiff-
maker paid a note which he claimed had been altered materially. The
court said there were no unauthorized alterations of the note, and also
that a threat to credit could not be duress, because it involved no danger
of personal harm, nor loss of liberty nor property.134 In the same class
of threats to prospective contract relations was the threat of a member
of a bondholders' committee to block a sale of the insolvent utility's
assets unless he was given a secret share in the profits of the deal by the
purchaser. The purchaser yielded, after considering the matter for five
weeks; then, over a year later, he asked the court to get back his bribe-
money. The court said the parties were in pari delicto, that there was
no such duress as to relieve the plaintiff from this disability, and refused
any refund.'3 5
I. PRESSURE ON STOCKHOLDER BY THREAT TO BREAK
CONTRACT WITH His CORPORATION
Two cases in our reports deal with situations where pressure has
been exerted on a stockholder by threat to disregard a contract obliga-
"' Ramp Buildings Corp. v. Northwest Building Co., 164 Wash. 603, 4 P. (2d)
507 (1931). A concurring opinion took the position that plaintiff's conduct should
be called, not "business compulsion," but duress.
... Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, 1 N. W. 997 (1879); see discussion below,
p. 348.
" Coleman v. Merchants National Bank, 6 Ohio Dec. 1063, 10 Am. Law
Record 49 (1881). The other cases in the group all reached the same conclusion;
but in them the evidence that threats were made was much weaker, based on impli-
cation or imagination of the victim. Fonville v. Wichita State Bank & Tr. Co., 161
Ark. 93, 255 S. W. 561 (1923); R. S. Jacobs Banking Co. v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 34 S. W. (2d) 173 (Mo. App. 1930) ; Sawyer et al. v. Gruner et al., 60
N. Y. Super. 285, 17 N. Y. Supp. 465 (1892); F. B. Collins Investment Co. v.
Easeley et al., 44 Okla. 429,'144 Pac. 1072 (1914) ; Harvey v. Girard Nat. Bank,
119 Pa. 212, 13 Atl. 202 (1888). In York v. Hinkle et al., 80 Wis. 624, 629, 50
N. W. 895, 896 (1891) rejecting a claim of duress based on a threat to force into
bankruptcy a corporation in which the victim held considerable stock, it was said
that the party making such threats was under no obligation to refrain from com-
municating them to possible purchasers of the victim's stock, so as to interfere
with his chance to sell the stock at a profit.
... Marshall v. Lovell, 19 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
1942]
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tion owed to his corporation, a contract obligation in which the stock-
holder had no legal rights, but in which he was vitally interested. In
both cases the threat was to cut off the credit of the corporation and so
drive it into bankruptcy; and in both the threat succeeded in forcing the
stockholder to transfer his corporate interest at a sacrifice. The victim
in the earlier case did not clearly prove a threat to break the contract with
the corporation, but this point was not treated as controlling; the decision
was decidedly unsympathetic to all the plaintiff's arguments for duress,
was not made to depend on this point.136
The later decision is equally emphatic in finding duress. The plain-
tiff, Harris, had spent several years locating coal lands and purchasing
them on option, for the corporation, in reliance on a contract by which
he was to have a two-ninths interest in the common stock, and Cary, the
defendant, was to furnish the necessary capital. After the corporation
had secured a large block of valuable options, Cary came forward with
a claim that their contract, rightly construed, did not entitle Harris to
a two-ninths share, and demanded that Harris transfer a part of his
interest to Cary. The new claim as to the construction of the contract
was probably advanced without any genuine belief in its validity; but
Cary said that he would cut off all further support of the corporation
and allow it to collapse unless Harris surrendered. The bill asking can-
cellation of the transfer of stock made in these circumstances was upheld
against demurrer.' 37 The court relied heavily on the analogy to duress
of goods, saying the plaintiff's corporate holdings were within the de-
fendant's control. There was no reference to the alternative remedy
available, a stockholder's representative action, which would probably
have been ineffective because of the delay involved.
J. THREAT TO SUE, OR RESORT TO OTHER CIVIL LEGAL REMEmiES
Courts and judicial processes exist for the purpose of enforcement
of rights against recalcitrant obligors, and it is not surprising that fre-
quently civil claims are settled only under a threat of resort to some
legal remedy; but it may seem startlingly unreasonable to suggest that
the resulting settlement might be voidable for duress. Such a threat is
no more than a statement of intent to refer a private dispute to a public
tribunal for orderly settlement; how can it be duress to tell the adverse
party that these tribunals are to be called in to administer justice accord-
ing to established law? An advance warning of a plan to use these
governmental institutions for the end they are supposed to serve often
shows consideration for the other fellow, and certainly seems far re-
moved from improper pressure; but resort to such a threat has been
"'6 York v. Hinkle, 80 Wis. 624, 50 N. W. 895 (1891).
... Harris v. Cary et al., 112 Va. 362, 71 S. E. 551 (1911).
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called duress by many litigants in our courts, not always without reason,
nor always without success.
In the great majority of such cases, however, the courts have re-
jected the claim that a threat of civil litigation was .duress. Sometimes
the threat was to sue on a cause of action ultimately shown to have been
Well founded, and was used to force discharge of the obligation on which
that cause was based; of course this is not the exercise of wrongful
pressure.' 3 8 Even where the threat to sue on a valid debt is used to
force the victim, not to pay that debt, but to enter into some other
transaction, the courts see nothing to condemn. So a bank threatened
to sue the maker on two overdue notes unless he would assume an
additional liability by indorsing two other notes made by his brother-in-
law; and the North Carolina courts enforced these indorsements, saying
there was no duress.' 3 9 The creditor's right to sue is regarded as
property which he can sell, as if it were a tract of land, on any terms he
chooses to insist upon. In other cases the rightfulness of the claim
made by the threatening party was not clearly disproved even in the
subsequent litigation on the issue of duress, and the transaction under
attack was defensible as a settlement of a possibly valid claim; the
tendency is strong to uphold such transactions, sometimes apparently
without much genuine study of the opposing contention.' 4 0 If the claim
on which suit was threatened was partly valid and partly invalid, the
threat is treated as being within the creditor's rights ;141 and this is
probably unobjectionable if the excess was not claimed in bad faith, and
if there was no tender of the amount properly due.
At the other extreme are a group of cases on which the authorities
are unanimous. If the party threatening suit was acting in bad faith
knowing he had no right of action, it is agreed that his victim deserves
relief which can properly be made available by finding duress.' 4 2
2'Hunt v. Bass et al., 17 N. C. 292 (1832); Harris v. Tyson, 24 Pa. 347
(1855).
1"' Charlotte Bank and Trust Co. v. Smith et al., 193 N. C. 141, 136 S. E. 358
(1927). To the same effect are Lilienthal et at. v. Geo. Bechtel Brewing Co., 118
App. Div. 205, 102 N. Y. Supp. 1051 (1st Dep't 1907); and Harris v. Tyson, 24
Pa. 347 (1855); cf. Neilson v. M'Donald et al., 6 Johns. Ch. 201 (N. Y. 1822),
discussed below, p. 352, rev'd on, other grounds, 2 Cow. 139 (N. Y. 1823).
14o Manigault v. S. M. Ward & Co. et al., 125 Fed. 707 (C. C. S. C. 1903);
King v. Williams, 65 Iowa 167, 21 N. W. 502 (1884); Ripy Brothers Distilling
Co. v. Lillard, 149 Ky. 726, 149 S. W. 1009 (1912) ; Devereux v. Rochester Ger-
man Insurance Co., 98 N. C. 6, 3 S. E. 639 (1887) ; Zent v. Lewis, 90 Wash. 651,
156 Pac. 848 (1916) ; Crookshanks et al. v. Ransbarger et al., 80 W. Va. 21, 92
S. E. 78 (1917); Whittaker v. Southwest Va. Improvement Co., 34 W. Va. 217,
12 S. E. 5.07 (1890).
... Atkinson et al. v. Allen et al., 71 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895); Holt v:
Thomas et al., 105 Calif. 273, 38 Pac. 891 (1894) ; James et al. v. Dalbey et al., 107
Iowa 463, 78 N. W. 51 (1899); Kiler v. Wohletz, 79 Kan. 716, 101 Pac. 474
(1909) ; Hilborn v. Bucknam et al., 78 Me. 482, 7 Ati. 272 (1886).
142 Moise Brothers Co., Inc. v. Jamison, 89 Colo. 278, 1 P. (2d) 925 (1931):
Spaids v. Barrett et al., 57 Ill. 289 (1870) ; Rees v. Schmits et al., 164 Ill. App. 250
19421
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These cases on which there is no great dispute having been put aside,
there is a considerable group left; cases where there was a threat to
sue on a claim asserted in good faith, but later shown to have been quite
unfounded (or assumed to have been unfounded for purposes of ruling
on the issue of duress). So far as precedent is concerned, there is a
large degree of unanimity here also; few decisions find relievable duress
for the victim of such a threat. It makes no great difference whether
the later development showing invalidity of the claim was newly dis-
covered evidence 14 3 or newly discovered law. 1 44 So where the maker
was induced to pay his notes a second time by threat of the executor of
the payee to sue, and thereafter the maker uncovered clear evidence that
he had paid them during the payee's life, no relievable duress was
found.14 5 The same result was reached where the victim was related to
the claim asserted only by marriage, having become the second husband of
the widow of the decedent 'debtor, and he yielded to the threat of the
creditor to sue him.' 46 It was, presumably, newly discovered law, at least
to the creditor, that the successor to the deceased debtor's marital rights
did not take upon himself the decedent's financial obligation. In these
and similar cases the creditor was able by threats to secure and retain
that to which he had no rightful claim; but the victim could have secured
reasonable protection by resisting the claim in court,1 47 and no rational
explanation appeared for his reluctance to take this course of action.148
(1911) ; Chandler v. Sanger et al., 114 Mass. 364 (1874) ; White v. McCoy Land
Co., 224 Mo. App. 1019, 87 S. W. (2d) 672 (1935), aff'd sub. norm., White v.
Scarritt, 341 Mo. 1004, 111 S. W. (2d) 18 (1937) ; Aronoff et al. v. Levine et al.,
190 App. Div. 172, 179 N. Y. Supp. 247 (2d Dep't 1919), aff'd nemn., 232 N. Y.
529, 134 N. E. 558 (1921); Brownell v. Talcott, 47 Vt. 243 (1875) ; Sartwell v.
Horton, 28 Vt. 370 (1856); see Adams v. Reeves et al., 68 N. C. 134 (1873).
... New York Life Insurance Co. v. Chittenden & Eastman et al., 134 Iowa 613,
112 N. W. 96 (1907); Shockley v. Wickliffe et al., 150 S. C. 476, 148 S. E. 476
(1929).
.4. Monroe National Bank v. Catlin, 82 Conn. 227, 73 At. 3 (1909); Downs v.
Donnelly, 5 Ind. 496 (1854) ; City of Muscatine v. Keokuk Northern Line Packet
Co., 45 Iowa 185 (1876) ; Evans v. Gale, 18 N. H. 397 (1846) ; Sprague v. Birdsall,
2 Cow. 419 (N. Y. 1823); see Schelp v. Nicholls, 263 S. W. 1017 (Mo. App.
1924).
"' Shockley v. Wickliffe et al., 150 S. C. 476, 148 S. E. 476 (1929). The clear
evidence of prior payment was the fact that the original notes were in the maker's
hands, delivered to him when he paid them during the payee's life. This also proved
misrepresentation by the executor who had said he had the original notes among
the decedent's papers; but the court said there was no reliance on this misrepre-
sentation because the maker believed all along that the notes were in his own
possession, but -he could not find them.
148 Downs v. Donnelly, 5 Ind. 496 (1854).
14" Where newly discovered evidence was involved, as in Shockley v. Wickliffe
et al., 150 S. C. 476, 148 S. E. 476 (1929), of course resort to the courts would not
be assured protection for the victim unless the evidence was discovered before the
trial; but at any rate resort to the courts would be reasonable protection in the
sense that it is about all that is practicable for any judicial system to afford
litigants. Indefinite postponement while evidence is being searched for is hardly
to be expected.
8 ,'In Downs v. Donnelly, 5 Ind. 496 (1854) and in Evans v. Gale, 18 N. H.
(Vol. 20
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In other words, a remedy which was at least reasonably adequate was
available to him, if he had chosen to use it.
The reasons commonly given for refusing relief to the victim of a
threat to sue are not especially enlightening. Sometimes the courts have
simply said that a threat to seek legal remedies could not be duress,14 9
probably with the idea expressed by a South Carolina court that a con-
trary holding would defeat the purpose for which courts are instituted,150
and also the thought that if the threat were carried out the party sued
would have his day in court before his obligations were determined.
Other courts have settled this problem to their own satisfaction by argu-
ing that a threat to exercise a legal right cannot be duress,151 and assum-
ing, usually without saying it, that everyone has a clear legal right to
sue anyone else, at any time, on any alleged cause of action, in the
absence of malice:
A slight preponderance of authority denies relief even where the
victim dared not go into court with his valid defense because the mere
initiation of the litigation, regardless of its outcome, would have been
disastrous for him, as when a receivership was threatened, 152 or his
business was in such a precarious condition that any litigation would
have been ruinous.15 3 An attachment against the alleged interest of a
397 (1846), the victims said they yielded because of a personal dislike of litigation.
This idiosyncrasy (which did not hinder either of them from litigating as a plain-
tiff) is certainly not sufficient to make the remedy inadequate. The subjective test
of duress should not be allowed to go that far.
Monroe National Bank v. Catlin, 82 Com. 22, 73 Atl. 3 (1909) ; Buck et a!.
v. Axt, 85 Ind. 512 (1882) (threat apparently to sue on valid claim) ; New York
Life Insurance Co. v. Chittenden et al., 134 Iowa 613, 112 N. W. 96 (1907) ; Pryor
v. Hunter, 31 Neb. 678, 48 N. W. 736 (1891) ; Shockley v. Wickliffe et al., 150
S. C. 476, 148 S. E. 476 (1929); Houston Ice and Brewing Co. v. Harlan, 228
S. W. 1090 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921) (threat to sue on valid claim).
1o Shockley v. Wickliffe et al., 150 S. C. 476, 148 S. E. 476 (1929).
' McKenzie-Hague Co. v. Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corp., 73 F. (2d)
78 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (threat made in bad faith) ; Kreider et al. v. Fanning,
74 Ill. App. 230 (1897) (threat to sue on valid claim) ; Wilson Sewing Machine
Co. et al. v. Curry et al., 126 Ind. 161, 25 N. E. 896 (1890) (threat to sue on
allegedly excessive claim; court said duress argument so clearly insufficient that no
discussion was necessary) ; Kiler v. Wohletz, 79 Kan. 716, 101 Pac. 474 (1909) ;
Lilienthal et al. v. Geo. Bechtel Brewing Co., 118 App. Div. 205, 102 N. Y. Supp.
1051 (1st Dep't 1907) (threat apparently rightful) ; Charlotte Bank & Trust Co. v.
Smith et al., 193 N. C. 141, 136 S. E. 358 (1927) (threat to sue on valid claim) ;
Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Harlan, 228 S. W. 1090 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921)
(threat to sue on valid claim).
"2 Dick et al. v. Marx & Rawolle, Inc., 4 F. (2) 879 (App. D. C. 1925), cert.
denied, 268 U. S. 688, 45 S. Ct. 509, 69 L. ed. 1158 (1925); Byron v. Byron,
Heffernan & Co. et al., 98 N. J. L. 127, 119 At. 12 (Ct. Errors and App. 1922) ;
Cornwall v. Anderson et al., 85 Wash. 369, 148 Pac. 1 (1915) ; Walla Walla Fire
Insurance Co. v. Spencer et al., 52 Wash. 369, 100 Pac. 741 (1909).
' GLipman, Wolfe & Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., 258 Fed. 544 (C. C. A.
9th, 1919) ; Morton v. Morris, 72 Fed. 392 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896) ; Teem v. Town
of Ellijay, 89 Ga. 154, 15 S. E. 33 (1892) (demand, assumed wrongful, for $10,000
license fee for liquor sales two years earlier; town bought other claims against
victim, who was in financial crisis, and threatened suit forcing compromise pay-
-ment of $500 on license claim; held voluntary) ; Hipp v. Crenshaw, 64 Iowa 404. 20
1942]
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debtor in a going business is likely to embarrass or ruin that business
while the matter is in court for the purpose of proving that the debtor
had no interest in the firm; but this was not sufficient to make the note
given by the remaining partner to forestall the attachment proceeding
voidable for duress.' 5 4 An injunction against a play which is ready to
open would in many cases practically close out the producer, even if he
were able to show in the course of the injunction proceeding that the
petitioner's claim was without foundation; but a court refused to see any
duress in such a situation, without recognizing any necessity to discuss
the merits of the petitioner's claim, or the chances that the producer
could have escaped serious loss by posting a bond or otherwise prevent-
ing the issuance of a temporary restraining order.5 5 But the Michigan
court, which has had more than its share of trouble with this problem
of economic compulsion in many forms, 15 6 said that a settlement secured
from a creditor by the debtor's threats of stopping payments from other
parties to the creditor, at a time when, as the debtor knew, the creditor
was financially embarrassed, was voidable for duress; the reason given
was that the legal remedy available to the creditor-victim would not
meet the situation because -turing the delay incident to litigation the
victim's business would be ruined. 5 7 There are other decisions sup-
porting the same conclusion'-r s
The threat of a lawsuit which would seriously damage the reputa-
tion of the victim or a near relative has been treated as sufficient to show
duress.15 9 In some cases the fact that the victim was in poor health and
N. W. 492 (1884) (while appeal involving validity of judgment was pending,
debtor, in financial straits, had to pay off judgment in order to get mortgage) ;
Alamo Amusement Co. v. Harcol Motion Picture Industries, Inc., 147 So. 114
(La. App. 1933); Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, 1 N. W. 997 (1879); Weber v.
Kirkendall et al., 39 Neb. 193, 57 N. W. 1026 (1894) ; Hart v. Walsh et al., 84
Misc. Rep. 421, 146 N. Y. Supp. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Bolln v. Metcalf, 6 Wyo.
1, 42 Pac. 12 (1895); Maskell v. Homer, [1915] 3 K. B. 106.
14 Bolln v. Metcalf, 6 Wyo. 1, 42 Pac. 12 (1895), on rehearing, 6 Wyo. 1, 44
Pac. 694 (1896).
... Hart v. Walsh et al., 84 Misc. 421, 146 N. Y. Supp. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1914):
cf. Dana v. Kemble, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 545 (1836) (discussed in Part I, p. 273).
... See, for instance, Hackley et al. v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N. W. 511
(1881) (discussed in Part I, p. 257) ; Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N. W. 284
(1882) (discussed in Part I, pp. 260-1); Welch v. Beeching, 193 Mich. 338, 159
N. W. 486 (1916) (discussed below, p. 353).
...Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, 1 N. W. 997 (1879) (court called debtor's act
a wrong, but the basis of his threatened garnishment actions was not stated at all).8 Lipman, Wolfe & Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., 258 Fed. 544 (C. C. A.
9tb, 1919) ; Thurman v. Burt, 53 Ill. 129 (1870) ; Laterrade v. Kaiser, 15 La. Ann.
296 (1860) ; Lobit et al. v. Marcoulides et al., 225 S. W. 757 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920); Maskell v. Homer, [1915] 3 K. B. 106.
.. Lipman, Wolfe & Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., 258 Fed. 544 (C. C. A.
9th, 1919); Prickett v. Madison County, 14 Ill. App. 454 (1883); Mississippi
Valley Trust Co. v. Begley et al., 298 Mo. 684, 252 S. W. 76 (1923). Contra: Zent
v. Lewis. 90 Wash. 651, 156 Pac. 848 (1916) ; Batavian Bank v. North, 114 Wis.
637, 90 N. W. 1016 (1902) (vague threat of disgrace to victim's brother).
[Vol. 20
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so unable to resist effectively has influenced the court considerably to-'
ward a finding of duress based on a threat of litigation.' 60
The courts agree in finding duress where guardianship proceedings
have been threatened in order to procure property settlements in favor
of the individual making the threat.' 0 ' An Iowa court has said that
such arrangements are inescapably caught between the horns of a
dilemma both equally fatal to the settlement thus procured: either the
victim was a proper subject for guardianship proceedings, and the
settlement is voidable because of his incompetency; or else he was not a
proper subject for guardianship, so that the settlement is voidable be-
cause the proceedings should not have been initiated or threatened.' 62
The alternatives suggested may not be exhaustive, however; there is a
third possibility, that the subject was competent, but sufficient reasonable
doubt existed about his competency to make legal proceedings to estab-
lish the truth at least morally justifiable. If this was the situation, the
settlement would not be impaled on either horn of the Iowa court's
dilemma. But the possible incompetency which made the guardianship
proceeding justifiable probably made the settlement unjustifiable accord-
ing to any decent standards; and this idea suggests a sound basic reason
for refusing to enforce an agreement thus procured. Guardianship pro-
ceedings are provided for the protection of the property of the subject,
and the use made of them in the cases under discussion to enrich un-
scrupulous children is a misuse of the power to initiate such legal pro-
ceedings, as obviously anti-social and wrongful as when the power to
initiate a criminal prosecution is misused to force payment of a private
claim. This theory fits in nicely with another decision which indicates
that a threat to support guardianship proceedings is not duress if used
for a proper purpose. A mother had been placed under guardianship as
incompetent; and a separate guardian had been appointed for her two
minor children. The mother sought to terminate her own guardianship;
and in order to induce the guardian of the children not to oppose such
termination, she gave bond to provide certain fixed amounts for the
support of the children. Here, if it can be said that the children's guar-
dian made any threat, it was used, not for enrichment of the party
... Parker v. Hill, 85 Ark. 363 (1908); Hollingsworth v. Stone, 90 Ind. 244
(1883); cf. Horn v. Davis, 70 Ore. 498, 142 Pac. 544 (1914), where the victim
made a settlement, under threat to sue, because he felt 'hat to disprove the claim
asserted he would have to leave his wife who was ill; the court, saying he could
have refused to settle without making the investigation, found the settlement
voluntary, and also affirmed the lower court's refusal to allow amendment of the
pleadings to set up the duress issue.
... Harris v. Flack et at., 289 Il. 222, 124 N. E. 377 (1919) ; Foote et al. v.
DePoy et al., 126 Iowa 366, 102 N. W. 112 (1905) ; Gill's Trustee et al. v. Gill
ct al., 124 S. V. 875 (Ky. App. 1910); Hogan v. Leeper, 37 Okla. 655, 133 Pac.
190 (1913).
.2. Foote et al. v. DePoy et al., 126 Iowa 366, 102 N. W. 112 (1905).
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making the threat, but to insure that the parent would provide from her
estate for her children, as she was in duty bound to do; and the court
refused to set aside this agreement for duress.0 3 This was an eminently
proper use of the power to influence the disposition of guardianship
proceedings.
It has generally been treated as immaterial that the threat was not
to start an ordinary civil lawsuit, but to resort to some remedy which
was apt to exert more immediate pressure, such as attachment or gar-
nishment,'0 4 writ of restitution or ejectment, 165, levy of execution,'" 0
retention or enforcement of judgment lien,' 67 threat to sell property
under a judgment, 68 threat of receivership or bankruptcy proceed-
ings,' 6 9 or of some other extraordinary legal procedure ;17o authority is
18 Lawrence v. Morris et al., 167 App. Div. 186, 152 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1st
Dep't 1915).
... Holding threat of attachment or garnishment not duress (claim on which
threat based invalid, or assumed to be invalid, except where otherwise specified) :
Satchfield v. Laconia Levee District, 74 Ark. 270, 85 S. W. 409 (1905) ; Remington
Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Feeney Tool Co., 97 Conn. 129, 115 Al.
629 (1921) (threat of attachment on claim partly valid, partly invalid) ; McClair
v. Wilson et al., 18 Colo. 82, 31 Pac. 502 (1892) (claim apparently valid) ; Teem
v. Town of Ellijay, 89 Ga. 154, 15 S. E. 33 (1892) (apparently valid claims)
Myers v. Watson, 204 Iowa 635, 215 N. W. 634 (1927) (apparently valid claim)
Paulson v. Barger, 132 Iowa 547, 109 N. W. 1081 (1906) ; Shelby v. Bowman, 64
Kan. 879, 68 Pac. 1131 (1902) ; Wailer v. Cralle, 47 Ky. 11 (1848) (apparently
valid claim); Weber v. Kirkendall et al., 44 Neb. 766, 63 N. W. 35 (1895):
Natcher v. Natcher, 47 Pa. 496 (1864); Flack et al. v. National Bank of Com-
merce, 8 Utah 193, 30 Pac. 746 (1892); Bolin v. Metcalf, 6 Wyo. 1, 42 Pac. 12
(1895), on rehearing, 6 Wyo. 1, 44 Pac. 694 (1896) ; see Security Savings Bank v.
Kellems, 274 S. W. 112 (Mo. App. 1925), aFd, 321 Mo. 1, 9 S. W. (2d) 967
(1928). Contra, finding duress based on such threat: Welch v. Beeching, 193 Mich.
338, 159 N. W. 486 (1916) (debtor embarrassed by threat of garnishment while
away from home in another state; see case discussed below, p. 353); Vyne v.
Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, 1 N. W. 997 (1879); Collins v. Westhury et al., 2 Bay 211
(S. C. 1799) (another case of threat to sue in foreign jurisdiction).
18 Holding no duress: Davis v. Rice, 88 Ala. 388, 6 So. 751 (1889) ; Emmons v.
Scudder, 115 Mass. 367 (1874) ; Perkins v. Trinka, 30 Minn. 241, 15 N. W. 115
(1883); Pottsville Bank* v. Cake, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 61 (1899) (apparently valid
claim).
18 Holding no duress: Strange v. Franklin et al., 126 Ga. 715, 55 S. E. 943
(1906) (claim apparently valid, but judgment invalid for lack of jurisdiction);
Wilcox v. Howland, 40 Mass. 167 (1839) (claim apparently valid) ; State ex rel.
Sanborn v. Stonestreet et al., 92 Mo. App. 214 (1902) (claim assumed partly valid,
partly invalid) ; Gerecke e al. v. Campbell, 24 Neb. 306, 38 N. 'V. 847 (1888)
(judgment irregular but not void) ; Dispeau v. First National Bank of Pawtucket,
53 Atl. 868 (R. I. 1902) (claim apparently valid). Contra: Thurman v. Burt, 53
Ill. 129 (1870) ; Hollingsworth v. Stone, 90 Ind. 244 (1883) ; Neilson v. M'Donald
et al., 6 Johns. Ch. 201 (N. Y. 1822) (claim valid; reversed for laches and on
other grounds, 2 Cow. 139 (N. Y. 1823) ; see case discussed below, p. 352).
187Holding no duress: Stover v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 213 (1867) ; Hipp v. Cren-
shaw, 64 Iowa 404, 20 N. W. 492 (1884) ; Lathrop v. McBride, 31 Neb. 289, 47
N. W. 922 (1891). Contra: Lobit et al. v. Marcoulides et al., 225 S. W. 757 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1920).
188 Holding no duress: In re First National Bank of St. Albans, 49 Fed. 120
(C. C. Vt. 1891) (judgment irregular); Mariposa Co. v. Bowman, 16 Fed. Cas.
755, No. 9089 (C. C. Calif. 1867) ; Manning v. Poling e al.. 114 Iowa 20, 83 N. W.
895 (1901) ; Weaver v. Stacy et al., 93 Iowa 683, 62 N. W. 22 (1895) ; Richardson
v. Brown, 260 Mass. 509, 157 N. E. 603 (1927).
... Holding no duress (claims apparently valid in all cases except as noted)"
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divided on the question whether it is duress to threaten the filing of an
unfounded or excessive mechanic's lien.17 ' But the power to initiate
such proceedings (or, indeed, an ordinary lawsuit) may, like the power
to initiate guardianship proceedings, be resorted to under' such unfair
circumstances that the use may reasonably be described as an abuse of
the power. When a claimant plans to sue he is not likely to select the
time which is most convenient for his opponent. But sometimes it is
apparent that a plaintiff has carefully timed his attack for a moment
when the defendant is helpless, unable to assert any defense. The best
illustration is the attachment of the alleged debtor's ice wagons just
before they were ready to start on their daily deliveries to his customers.
The victim suggested release by an attachment bond, but the claimant
remarked it would take some three -days to arrange that. The claim was
paid, but a later action based on duress forced a refund.1 72 That claim-
ant knew he had no cause of action, so the case is one of those we have
excluded as involving a mala fide claim; but the same conclusion should
certainly be reached if the claim was invalid but asserted in good faith.
Not that the claimant should be forced to await the end of the summer
before attaching the ice wagons; but if he does attach when it is im-
possible for the alleged debtor to use his defense, then an opportunity
later to try out the claim on the merits should be allowed through appli-
French v. Shoemaker, 14 Wall. 314, 20 L. ed. 852 (1872) ; Dick et al. v. Marx &
Rawolle, Inc., 4 F. (2d) 879 (App. D. C. 1925) (merits of claim not discussed) ;
Fuller et al. v. Roberts, 35 Fla. 110, 17 So. 359 (1895) ; Snyder et ux. v. Braden,
58 Ind. 143 (1877) ; Byron v. Byron, Heffernan & Co. et al, 98 N. J. L. 127, 119
Ati. 12 (Ct. Errors and App. 1922) ; Peabody et al. v. Tenney et al., 18 R. I. 498,
30 Atl. 456 (1894) ; Cornwall v. Anderson et al., 85 Wash. 369, 148 Pac. 1 (1915) ;
Walla Walla Fire Insurance Co. v. Spencer et al., 52 Wash. 369, 100 Pac. 741(1909) (merits of claim in dispute). Contra: Rose v. Owen, 45 Ind. App. 137, 85
N. E. 129 (1908) (merits of claim disputed).
..0 In all of these cases the courts refused to find duress. Threat of arrest on
civil claim: Prichard v. Sharp, 51 Mich. 432, 16 N. W. 798 (1883) (merits of
claim not discussed, described as immaterial) ; Dunham v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224,
3 N. E. 76 (1885) (disputed claim). Threat of distress warrant: Webber v.
Aldrich, 2 N. H. 461 (1822) (apparently invalid claim) ; Colwell v. Peden, 3 Watts
327 (Pa. 1834) (disputed claim); Glynn v. Thomas, 11 Ex. 870, 156 Eng. Rep.
1085 (1856) (claim partly valid, partly invalid). Threat of injunction to protect
disputed claim: Hart v. Walsh et al., 84 Misc. Rep. 421, 146 N. Y. Supp. 235(Sup. Ct. 1914). Threat of replevin: James C. McGuire & Co. v. H. G. Vogel
Co., 164 App. Div. 173, 149 N. Y. Supp. 756 (1st Dep't 1914) (threat of replevin
to collect invalid claim alleged as duress; demurrer sustained). Threat of man-
damus: Supervisors of Onondaga v. Briggs, 2 Denlo 26 (N. Y. 1846) (claim partly
valid, partly invalid). Threat of securing writ of ne exeat: Gunter v. Thomas, 36
N. C. 199 (1840) (part of claim disputed). But see the discussion of cases on
threat of guardianship proceedings above, p. 349.
I" Finding of duress based on such a threat: Joannin et al. v. Ogilvie et al., 49
Minn. 564, 52 N. W. 217 (1892) ; Gates et al. v. Dundon et al., 42 N. Y. St. Rep.
660, 18 N. Y. Supp. 149 (N. Y. City Ct. 1891), reed for failure to plead duress,
46 N. Y. St. Rep. 757, 19 N. Y. Supp. 390 (N. Y. City Ct. 1892). Contra: Abel-
man v. Indelli & Conforti Co., 170 App. Div. 740, 156 N. Y. Supp. 740 (1st Dep't
1915).
72 Chandler v. Sanger et al., 114 fass. 364 (1874) ; cf. Spaids v. Barrett et aL,
57 Ill. 289 (1870).
1942]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cation of the doctrine of duress. Where the underlying claim is valid,
threat of such seizure announced at a moment deliberately selected to
put the debtor at a serious disadvantage has been held insufficient to
show abuse of process or duress.173 But the New York Court of
Chancery furnishes some opposing authority more than a century old.
A creditor holding a valid judgment against N, and notes made by N's
son, wanted to force N to assume liability on the notes. With this in view,
an execution sale on the judgment was planned for a day when N would
be unable to secure cash, and so to prevent sacrifice of his household
goads and other property, except by complying with any terms the
creditor insisted on for postponement of the sale, The creditor thus got
the agreement he wanted for N; but the agreement was canceled by the
court, which talked of coercion, abuse of process and conspiracy.1 74
When a dispute exists as to whether a judgment is a lien on a certain
property interest or not, means are generally found for settling the mat-
ter by a final adjudication before enforcement of the judgment. But in
three reported cases payments have been made under threat of sale of
the payor's property interest on execution, and later the courts have
either reversed the judgment on which the execution was based, or have
found that it did not reach the payor's interest in the property. Neither
of the payors was able to get back any part of the money he had paid,
on the basis of duress or any other theory. One such victim, Ferguson.
had purchased land at a mortgage foreclosure sale. A judgment creditor
of the mortgagor claimed a lien on the land prior to the mortgage, and
the lower court had upheld his claim. While Ferguson's appeal from
this decision was pending, the redemption period under the sale on the
creditor's judgment was running, and Ferguson paid the judgment just
before the period expired. The appellate court held the judgment lien
was subordinate to Ferguson's claim; but no duress was found to justify
recovery of the sum paid on the judgment. The decision was made to
turn on the fact that Ferguson had a sufficient remedy available, which
he failed to use; he could have applied to the appellate court for an order
to maintain the status quo, staying the running of the redemption period
until the matter was finally adjudicated.lla Plainly the only reason
Ferguson did not secure such a restraining order was that he (and his
attorney) did not know it was available or necessary; the payment was
caused by a mistake of law. The layman Ferguson might well feel that
' McClair v. Wilson et al., 18 Colo. 82, 31 Pac. 502 (1892) ; Myers v. Watson,
204 Iowa 635, 215 N. V. 634 (1927) ; compare the cases in note 153, above, where
the debtor was in a financial crisis making defense impracticable, but there was less
clear evidence of careful timing of the attack by the creditor.
I" Neilson v. M'Donald et at., 6 Johns. Ch. 201 (N. Y. 1822), res'd on other
grounds, 2 Cow. 139 (N. Y. 1823).
' Manning v. Poling et al.. 114 Iowa 20, 83 N. W. 895 (1900), aff'd on rehear-
ing. 114 Iowa 20. 86 N. W. 30 (1901).
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the court's decision was somewhat like calling a payment made at the
point of a gun voluntary because the gun was not loaded. The other
cases reached the same result on facts not significantly different.176
Bringing an alleged debtor into court in another situation unusually
burdensome for him has been condemned by the decisions finding reliev-
able duress when the victim yielded to threats of litigation in a foreign
jurisdiction where he would be seriously embarrassed in making his
defense, or otherwise put at an unfair disadvantage. Mrs. Welch, a
widow working to support her family went from her home in Indiana
to Michigan to close a small business deal. Just as she was ready to col-
lect her commission, she was faced with a garnishment proceeding based
on a claim to which she had a complete defense; but she surrendered
$175 of her $200 commission to the claimant. The court, in her action
to recover the money thus paid, emphasized the facts that plaintiff was
a woman, nervous, away from home, and argued that the subjective test
of duress required a judgment for her.177 A substantial group of de-
cisions agree with this case in finding duress in threats of litigation
against a victim embarrassed in making his defense good simply because
he is not at home,' 78 although a number take the other view. 179 Yet it
may be doubted whether a defendant is in any weaker position to estab-
lish a meritorious defense simply because he is away from home in a
sister state where the system of jurisprkidence is the same as in his home
state, than is a party sued at home at a time when a delay of a few weeks
in establishing his rights will mean business collapse. The decisions re-
fusing to find duress in the latter situation 8 0 seem fundamentally incon-
sistent with these cases based on suit in a foreign jurisdiction. Moreover
the decisions finding duress do not refer to the fact that where parties
reside in different states, either the plaintiff or the defendant will
necessarily have to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction.
If the threat to sue is to be treated as basis for relievable duress.
according to the formula which has been set out as the cornerstone
thesis of this article, that threat must be wrongful in some sense. It is
not an actionable wrong, in the absence of malice. We must keep the
217 Weaver v. Stacy et at., 93 Iowa 683, 62 N. W. 22 (1895); Richardson v.
Brown, 260 Mass. 509, 157 N. E. 603 (1927).
"" Welch v. Beeching, 193 Mich. 338, 159 N. W. 486 (1916).1 8 Fenwick Shipping Co. v. Clarke Brothers, 133 Ga. 43, 65 S. E. 140 (1909):
Mulholland v. Bartlett, 74 Ill. 58 (1874) (contract signed under threat of suit in
Canada on invalid claim while victim visiting there; held, contract defective for
lack of consideration, no reference to duress) ; Kelley v. Osborn et al.. 86 Mo.
App. 239 (1900); Wright v. Tower, 1 Browne App. 1 (Pa. 1801): Collins v.
Westbury et at., 2 Bay 211 (S. C. 1799).
"' Atkinson et al. v. Allen et al., 71 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895) (part of claim
admittedly due; victim in financial crisis) : Kohler v. Wells Fargo & Co., 26 Calif.
606 (1864); Watson v. Cunningham, 1 Blackf. 321 (Ind. 1824): Dickerman v.
Lord et al., 21 Iowa 338 (1866) : Walter v. Cralle, 47 Ky. 11 (1847).
180 See cases cited in notes 152-5 above.
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judicial processes available to determine controversies, and have re-
garded this necessity as barring the imposition of a liability for damages
on the plaintiff merely because he is defeated. This is certainly the rea-
son that, where threat of a lawsuit has been put forward as duress the
courts, as has been said, have frequently relied heavily on the statement
that a threat to do what one has a legal right to do cannot be duress.181
But the problem needs more consideration than that statement indi-
cates; "the word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls .... 1,182
In the first place, in spite of the fact that no substantial penalty can
result, it may be doubted whether one has a right, in the fullest sense of
the word, to start a lawsuit which is not well founded. The determina-
tion at the end of the action is what the rights were at the beginning.
'Under our imperfect human institutions we cannot determine the rights
of the parties until the matter has been adjudicated; therefore we must
not restrict too severely the power to initiate litigation.' 8 3 Hence the
only penalty imposed for starting a lawsuit which proves to be without
foundation is normally a liability for costs and disbursements. As a
result, we are unable to give perfect protection to what must in reason
be recognized as the tight of a citizen in a civilized society to be free of
annoyance by any unfounded legal proceeding. The conclusion indicated
is that any threat to sue is wrongful, as the word is used in this analysis
of duress, merely because the cause of action was one which would have
failed.
It should be recognized that the ability which a member of an or-
ganized society has to start a lawsuit is not a right, but a power, which
is capable of being put to improper ends; and that any abuse of that
power is a wrong.18 4 This is surely the correct analysis of the many
cases of duress based on the threat of criminal prosecution used to force
payment from a relative of the embezzler. The initiation of criminal
proceedings against the guilty party would not be a wrong in any sense,
certainly not an actionable wrong; but the power to initiate such pro-
ceedings used to collect private debts, is used wrongfully.lsa So the
'" See cases above, note 151; Durfee, Recovery of Money Paid under Duress
of Legal Proceedings in Michigan-Welch v. Beeching (1917) 15 MIcH. L. REv.
228, 234.
" "But the word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to
slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the con-
clusion." Mr. Justice Holmes in American Bank & Trust Co. el al. v. Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta et al., 256 U. S. 350, 358, 41 Sup. Ct. 499, 500, 65 L. ed.
983, 990 (1921).
... Durfee. Recover, of Moncy Paid under Duress of Legal Proceedings in
Michigan-Welch v. Beeching (1917) 15 Micu. L. REv. 228, 234.
', See the classification of means by German legal writers into (a) means in
themselves unlawful, (b) means which were quite lawful, and (c) means which
were allowable until used to secure an unjustified advantage. Dawson, Economic
Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law (1937) 11 TUL. L.
REv. 3415. 363, n. 67.
"55 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS (Rev. ed. 1937), §1611 citing cases.
[Vol. 20
DURESS BY ECONOMIC PRESSURE
son who tells his aged and somewhat weakened father that if the latter
does not convey certain property to the son, an action will be started to
appoint a guardian for the father, is not threatening to commit an
actionable wrong. But according to the argument already set out, the
son is using the power to initiate guardianship proceedings, not to pre-
serve the alleged incompetent's estate, which is the purpose for which the
power is given, but to secure what he wants for himself from the estate;
the threat is wrongful because it looks to the abuse of the power to
initiate litigation, and so is properly held relievable duress.1 8 6 So where
a lawsuit is threatened in bad faith, by one who is quite conscious that
his position is insupportable, there is a deliberate use of the power to
initiate litigation for a purpose quite foreign to its proper end; hence
the courts here also find a wrongful threat, and duress such as calls for
relief. L87
Even where there is no bad faith or other obvious ground for claim-
ing abuse of the power to initiate litigation, still, as has been said, there
is some element of injustice merely in starting an action which ulti-
mately proves unfounded; the judgment for the 'defendant usually in-
cludes costs and disbursements, a nominal recognition of the defendant's
right to some compensation for being required to defend himself against
a baseless charge. The normal remedy available for redress of this in-
justice, in addition to collection of these costs and disbursements, is
merely the establishment of a successful defense in the courtroom. But
when the threat of litigation comes at a period of financial crisis such
that it is not practicable for the victim to defend himself, this remedy
may properly be called inadequate. To the contractor whose entire capi-
tal, equipment, and staff are tied up in one project, and who is charged
with a serious breach of contract, it makes little difference what assur-
ance he and his attorneys feel in the ultimate success of his defense, if
in the several weeks or months while that defense is being established,
he will suffer a heavier loss, by a complete blocking of all productive
enterprise by his whole plant, than can be paid for by any judgment he
can expect from the litigation. If the threatened -defendant has in fact
a good defense, but is caught in a situation where the delays or other
disadvantages incident to litigation make it more burdensome to him to
assert it in court than to surrender without a fight, he should be entitled
to the protection of the doctrine of duress, at least in the absence of
countervailing equities deserving of protection in the party making the
threat, equities which I have not discovered in the cases so far.'8 8 This
188 See above, p. 349. 87 See above, p. 345.
188 Interesting complications may arise. Suppose both parties are in a financial
crisis, so that neither can afford to wait? In that case, the settlement reached
between them before litigation might well be denied finality, and treated as merely
tentative until the courts have passed on the controversy. No heavy penalty results,
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is the only way to give him any effective protection in his right to assert
his meritorious defense. If our rules force the victim, in order to
present his defense, to suffer a larger loss than a successful defense will
make good, we are simply taking away his defense.
K. THREAT TO REFUSE TO MAKE CONTRACT'
A person who merely refused to expend his own money for the
purchase of property, or for a loan, or who refused to sell goods or
land which belonged to him, would hardly be accused of committing a
wrong in any sense of the word. Except on the part of public utilities,
we are not used to recognizing any obligation on one person to enter
into contractual relations, on any terms whatsoever, with any other
person. And, in England and America, it is generally considered that
either party may attach to his assent any conditions he cares to insist
upon. Yet in a surprising number of cases, relief from hard conditions
in a contract has been sought on the theory that the opposite party was
guilty of duress in refusing to make the contract on reasonable terms;
but the argument has almost invariably failed. If the contract was a
composition with creditors, and one creditor succeeded in getting a
secret bonus for signing, he may be forced to refund it, and some of
the decisions so holding refer to coercion ;189 but the fraud on the other
creditors is probably the true justification for the rule. But refusal to
furnish, on fair terms, capital' 90 or merchandise' 0 ' or services' 92 neces-
sary for continuance of a business enterprise is practically unanimously
held not to be duress. The same holding has been reached in various
the settlement simply requiring the party who would have lost in the first place
to carry the burden of ultimate defeat. But suppose he has relied upon the settle-
ment reached and changed his position so as to create something like an estoppel?
Then the courts might take this into consideration. Laches, in all events, would
be fatal.
... Breck v. Cole, 4 Sandf. 79 (N. Y. 1850). In Solinger v. Earle, 82 N. Y.
393 (1880), the court denied recovery of money paid on note given by debtor's
brother-in-law to induce a creditor to join in composition, saying the contract was
illegal and the parties in par delicto.
... See, for example, Shriver v. Druid Realty Co., 149 1%d. 385, 131 At. 815(1926) ; Willett et al. v. Herrick et al., 258 Mass. 585, 155 N. E. 589 (1927) ; Mac-
Farland v. Liberty National Bank of N. Y. et al., 166 N. Y. Supp. 393 (Sup.
Ct. 1917) ; cf. Administrators of Hough v. Hunt, 2 Ohio 495 (1826).
191 Dennehy et al. v. McNulta et al., 86 Fed. 825 (C. C. A. 7th, 1898) ; Standard
Box Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 10 Calif. App. 746, 103 Pac. 938 (1909). In
Smith v. Win. Charlick, Ltd., 34 Austr. C. L. R. 38 (1924). the governmental
wheat monopoly forced payment by a miller of a bonus for grain already sold and
delivered, by threat to refuse to sell him any more grain; both the majority
decision refusing any refund, and dissenting opinions, contain interesting discus-
sions of the problem of duress in this type of situation.
'
9 2 Deibel v. Jefferson Bank, 200 Mo. App. 541. 207 S. W. 869 (1919) (services
of clearing house association to bank) ; Sylvan Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Stadler, 115
Misc. Rep. 311, 188 N. Y. Supp. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (apartment lease) : Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Cocke. 56 S. W. (2d) 489 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) (film rentals).
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other situations,19 3 some of which involved great hardships on the vic-
"tim. So the dominant partner in a profitable enterprise, whose control
had been exercised by discharging the subordinate partner from em-
ployment and taking to himself a salary of $7,500 a year for assuming
the other's duties, threatened to continue this situation and not exercise
the option to dissolve which the partnership contract gave him unless
the co-partner ratified all of these acts. The agreement thus induced
was held voidable for duress by the lower court, 94 but the appellate
tribunal reversed and found no wrongful threat, and no duress.19 These
decisions, though not entirely palatable to one with a habitual sympathy
for the under-dog, are yet probably sound unless we are ready to aban-
don the common law dogma that a "peppercorn" of consideration is
sufficient to support any promise, for all the parties did in these cases
was to extract what they considered a sufficient price for their con-
tractual obligation.
Considered in the abstract, it seems almost too plain for argument
or discussion that refusal to make a contract is not, could not be, re-
lievable duress. But, as usual, study of more concrete instances will
reveal that the generalization may be too broad. In a few cases, con-
tract terms which seemed inequitable have been held relievable, or
payments recoverable, where secured by such pressure, although duress
is not always expressly referred to as a reason for the decision.
Three such cases were in equity. In the early 180 0 's a needy life-
tenant in tail conveyed the estate, by suffering a recovery, for a price
which was held inadequate, though apparently it was the only price
available. The life-tenant "recoveree" having died, the transaction was
set aside in equity in favor of the remainderman; the court explained
its decision in this statement:
"With respect to value, mere inadequacy of price is of no more
weight in equity than at law. If a man who meets his purchaser on
equal terms, negligently sells his estate at an undervalue, he has no title
to relief in equity. But a court of equity will inquire whether the
parties really did meet on equal terms; and if it be found that the
Stott Realty Co. v. Detroit Savings Bank, 274 Mich. 80, 264 N. W. 297
(1936) (judgment purchaser, after period for redemption had expired, extended
the period 60 days for a cash payment of $40,000, approved by receivership court;
recovery of this payment for duress was denied); Youssoupoff v. Widener, 246
N. Y. 174, 158 N. E. 64 (1927) (sale of Rembrandt pictures allegedly worth
150,000 for E100,000 because of seller's dire needs; court said price paid was fair
and also repudiated the seller's claim of duress) ; cf. MeNeill et al. v. Hall et al.,
220 N. C. 73, 16 S. E. (2d) 456 (1941) (threat to refuse to buy from A in order
to induce A not to sell to competitors, held not evidence of conspiracy; the court
said there was no fraud, intimidation or coercion).
, ' Shelton v. Trigg et al., 226 S. W. 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (rehearing
denied 1921).
"' Trigg et al.. v. Shelton, 249 S. W. 209 (Tex. Com. App. 1923).
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vendor was in distressed circumstances, and that advantage was taken
of that distress, it will avoid the contract."' 9 6
A few years later an Ohio court was presented with the reverse
situation, a contract of puirchase of land at an exorbitant overvaluation,
forced by the vendor on the vendee as a condition of a loan to the
vendee, who again was in desperate need of money. Before the con-
tract was fully performed, the borrower vendee died; his administrator
sought rescission in equity, and succeeded. In its discussion the court
emphasized the fact that the vendee's necessities were consciously ex-
ploited by the vendor, but got no closer to duress than to say that
equity would relieve from an unconscionable bargain, and that where
there is such inadequacy of price that the mind revolts at it, the court
will "lay hold on the slightest circumstances of oppression or advantage
to rescind the contract.'19 7
In the third equity case duress is even further from the reasons
assigned by the court for its decision, yet may well have played a con-
trolling part. A: banker offered to reveal the whereabouts of a $25,000
bank-deposit if the depositor, an amnesia victim who had lost track of
his holdings, would agree to pay $10,000 for the service. The agree-
ment was made, and the banker revealed the deposit in the bank of
which he was himself an officer. The agreement was attacked in an
action for an accounting, and held bad for constructive fraud, in con-
cealment of the officer's relationship to the bank and securing an unfair
advantage over the depositor. There was no reference to duress, but
the court spoke of the "exorbitant and inconceivable bargain" as the
obvious justification for its decision.198  In Massachusetts, however,
when the sole heir agreed to divide evenly with another relative of the
decedent any assets in the estate discovered through information given
by the latter, the court enforced the promise, rejecting the claim of
duress, and the informant collected about $1,300.19'
Economic compulsion was the avowed basis for the decision of a
New York court requiring an employer to refund money received from
his employee under an agreement for "kick-back" of part of the pre-
tended wages named in the employment contract.2°° Such agreements,
in general, were illegal under a statute which, however, seems not to
"'Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 417, 56 Eng. Rep. 558 (1818). That inequality be-
tween contracting parties is sufficient to bring relief in equity, see dictum in James
v. Kerr, 40 Ch. Div. 449 (1889).
... Administrators of Hough v. Hunt, 2 Ohio 495 (1826); cf. cases cited in
note 190 above on refusal to lend money.
... Gierth v. Fidelity Trust Co. et al.. 93 N. J. Eq. 163, 115 Ati. 397 (1921).
" Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 150 N. E. 9 (1926).
... Caivano v. Brill, 171 Misc. Rep. 298, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 498 (N. Y. City Ct.
1939).
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have been applicable to the case before the court. 20 1 The court empha-
sized the inequality of bargaining power between the parties, and said
the agreement was made and carried out under "economic pressure."
The only possible threat involved was the threat to refuse a contract
of employment unless the "kick-back" agreement was made, so the case
clearly seems to hold that such a threat is relievable' duress. Other
authority can be found for the contention that an employer's threat of
refusal to make agreements with his employees except on unreasonable
terms may give the employees basis for claiming duress. 20 2
A California court settled a troublesome case by reference to duress
(among other reasons) in a situation where the only threat discussed
was to refuse to enter into a proposed agreement modifying an earlier
contract between the parties. A paving job, under a contract with a
city, was worked on diligently under the constant supervision of city
engineers who never made any objection to the progress being made,
yet it became apparent that it could not be completed by the date set
in the agreement. It was shown that when there was no complaint as
to the performance of such contracts, any extensions of time reasonably
necessary were customarily granted as a matter of course. The city
officers in this case, however, refused any extension unless the contractor
would lease to the city certain valuable business property for ten years
at a nominal rental. The contractor was staggered at the proposal,
and protested, but was jauntily told by the city fathers ". . . you will
have to be a good dog. We got you where we want you. . . ." The
contractor signed the lease, but the courts later refused to enforce it.
The decision might have been placed on the ground that the original
contract included an implied agreement for any extension of time tlhat
proved to be reasonably necessary; but "compulsion and the employ-
ment of coercive methods" was one of the reasons specified by the
court for relieving the contractor, along with lack of consideration and
a vague reference to public policy.20 3 This case illustrates another point
that should be mentioned, the difficulty of classifying the threat used
in a particular situation. The California court talked about the threat
to refuse to make the extension agreement. But that threat may pos-
sibly have gained its force because of an implied threat in the back-
ground to sue for breach of the contract. Or the court might have
seen it as a threat to break the original contract, if it was an implied
term of that contract that reasonable extensions of time should be
allowed.
0'o People v. Brill, 255 App. Div. 452, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 949 (lst Dep't 1938)
seems to involve the same employment contract.
202 Mitchell v. Pratt, 17 Fed. Cas., No. 9668 at 516 (C. C. Md. 1841) ; see State
er rel. Smith v. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155, 161, 136 N. W. 584, 586 (1912).
20' Oswald v. City of El Centro, 211 Calif. 45, 292 Pac. 1073 (1930).
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A similar difficulty in classifying the threat used is instanced by two
other decisions, where the language of the courts suggests pressure
exerted by refusal to enter into an agreement, but some would have
described the situation as involving a threat to disregard a pre-existing
implied contractual obligation. In each case a person with a partial
interest, or a merely nominal interest, in the proceeds of an insurance
policy, was in a position to block all recovery by refusing to sign a
receipt, until he received or was promised an excessive share of the
payment. One dispute was between lessor and lessee, both named as
insured in a fire policy; the lessor, apparently in good faith, claimed
what the court called a disproportionate share of the insurance money,
and refused to sign any proofs of loss or receipt until his demands
were met. The lessee surrendered because his business was waiting
on re-building; the court required repayment, saying that the lessor
prevailed by duress. 20 4 The other case arose between the assignor and
assignee of a life policy. The insurer refused payment, at maturity,
because the beneficiary-assignor had not signed the receipt form on the
back of the policy, and the beneficiary refused to sign any receipt until
she was promised about a third of the proceeds of the policy. The
court said the beneficiary was not legally obligated to sign the receipt;
but enforcement of the assignee's promise was refused.20 5 The two
judges sitting on the case on appeal gave different reasons for their
conclusion; one talked of extortion and oppression, while the other said
the promise was "wholly without consideration, or perhaps I might
more properly say wholly without any substantial consideration. ' 20
So, in a few instances, the mere use of unequal bargaining power
to force a person in an unusually distressing situation to agree to hard
contract terms is treated as duress. It is certainly not typical of our
system of law to treat any refusal to contract as a wrong involving the
slightest legal consequences; but these decisions depart from that tradi-
tion. It is to be noted that when the courts in such cases find a wrong
serious enough to deserve relief, there is no need to consider adequacy
of remedy. The remedy is always inadequate, for, aside from the doc-
trine of duress, there is no legal remedy whatsoever available to the
victim of this type of wrong; except in the case of public utilities, no
obligation to make contracts on reasonable terms exists in our laws.
These cases, where refusal to make a contract on what the court
considers reasonable terms is treated as coercion, bring out sharply the
conflict between this new extension of the doctrine of duress and the
'0' Guetzkow Bros. Co. v. Breese ef al., 96 Wis. 591, 72 N. W. 45 (1897).
2.. Caplice v. Kelley et al., 27 Kan. 359 (1882); on appeal from earlier trial,
Kelley ct al. v. Caplice, 23 Kan. 474 (1880).
20. 27 Kan. 359, 374.
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axiom of our law that inequality of consideration is immaterial to the
validity of an agreement. In these decisions we have taken a step
away from this fundamental thesis of Anglo-American contract law
toward the continental view that an enforceable contract should be a
reasonable exchange of values. The whole idea of duress by economic
pressure fits beautifully into a system which normally treats the reason-
ableness of contract terms as a matter of concern for the courts; and,
as has been said, in German law, economic duress is a means of imple-
menting an avowed policy of blocking enforcement of contracts which
call for an unreasonably disproportionate exchange of values.2 0 7
In spite of its effect on our doctrine of consideration, there is con-
siderable force in the argument against the enforceability of a contract
to pay $10,000 merely for revealing information which has come to the
payee by chance of the whereabouts of $25,000 belonging to the payor.
Where a transfusion of a peculiar type of blood was necessary to save
a life, a rule which would block collection of such an exorbitant price
for the service as to impoverish the sick man and his family, would
render substantial benefit to society. If the ethics of the medical pro-
fession had not, to a large extent, attained the same end by other means,
it is probable that physicians would have imposed on them by law the
obligation to render services for reasonable rates. In such cases the
doctrine of economic coercion would meet a social need; the question
is whether the doctrine can be so limited as not to interfere unduly with
the idea in our law that individuals should be left to fix the terms of
their own contracts. Experience with more cases may show the prac-
ticability of such limitations. If not, the doctrine is unlikely to see much
extension in this field, and the cases calling refusal to make contracts
on reasonable terms relievable duress will probably remain, as they are
now, decidedly in the minority. Another possibility is that the age of
individually negotiated contracts is passing. The tendency of the last
few years for government to interfere in the contracting process so as
to control especially prices has been much accentuated within the past
few months, since December 7, 1941. We hope these interferences are
temporary only; but some permanent effect on our whole idea of free-
dom of contract will surely result. And as our veneration for the freely
negotiated contract wanes, the doctrine of duress by threat to refuse to
make a contract is very likely to grow.
L. CONCLUSIONS
1. Wrongfullness of the Threat
If duress is based upon a wrongful threat under such circumstances
that other normal legal remedies do not offer adequate protection, some
2"o Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German
Law (1937) 11 TUL. L. Rnv. 345, 363.
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attempt at definition of the two major concepts in the formula must be
made; and this in spite of the fact that it is dangerous to draw con-
clusions because the doctrine is still in process of development.
It seems a safe generalization that wherever a court finds duress,
economic or otherwise, the finding is based on a threat which the court
feels is wrongful in some sense. This is one of those abstractions so
plainly self-evident and axiomatic that its very obviousness suggests
suspicion as to its infallibility; but it appears to stand up under scrutiny.
A finding of duress is a means to the overturning of a transaction (it
may be a contract or a payment), because the retention of the benefit
would be unjustifiable as between the parties. The controlling element
in the case, and the only element which could make the retention un-
justifiable, is the pressure by which the benefit was secured; so the
finding of duress is necessarily a disapproval of that pressure, an ex-
pression of the feeling that the threat, or the use made of it, is to be
condemned as in some degree anti-social, wrongful.
Plenty of authority can be found indicating that the threat must be
to commit an actionable wrong.208 Certainly where the courts have
found duress, physical or economic, there has generally been a threat of
actionable wrong. Many decisions state flatly that it cannot be duress
to threaten to do what one has a right to do,20° which is probably in-
tended to mean that a threat to commit an actionable wrong is essential.
Although this definition of "wrongful" seems to me, as set out more
than once already, much too narrow, to many it will appear too broad.
Some will feel it is especially unfair to describe a threat as wrongful
simply because it is later shown to have been a threat to commit an
actionable wrong, taking the position that the threat should not be con-
demned unless uttered in bad faith, by one who knows, or at least should
reasonably know, that he is threatening to commit an actionable wrong.
The party making the threat may be acting in perfect innocence, having
confident advice from able attorneys, with good ground for believing
that he is proposing simply to enforce his contract (or other legal
right). If it later develops, after litigation, that the course he was
threatening to take would have been a breach of contract it may seem
hard to find him guilty of duress for thus asserting what he, with
reason, believed to be his right. But the good faith of the party would
not have protected him from liability if the threat had been carried out;
and the threat itself should be judged, for present purposes. by its social
significance, with as little regard for the motive behind it as if we were
2" Of course this need not be taken to mean that the utterance of the threat
itself constituted an actionable wrong, but simply that the utterance of the threat
was an evil practice which should be discouraged at least by requiring the return
of benefits so secured.
"'0 See for instance cases cited in note 151 above.
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judging the execution of the threat. This is particularly true since the
only effect of the finding of duress is not to impose any burden of
damages on the dominant party, but simply to force him to return that
which he forced from his victim by means of the threat to commit a
wrong; in the light of this result, describing the threat as wrongful
does not appear so hard even from the viewpoint of the party uttering
it. So the insurer who denies the disability of his insured and threatened
to forfeit the policy, in spite of a disability premium waiver clause,
unless premiums are kept up, is acting in perfect good faith ;210 the
existence of such disability is a most troublesome question of fact. But
the insured, if denied recourse to the doctrine of duress, is in a dilemma
where he cannot escape a risk of heavy loss; while he is litigating his
claim of disability, he must either default on the premiums and risk
losing his whole investment in the policy if the lawsuit goes against him,
or he must pay the premiums and lose all claim to that money even
though he wins the lawsuit. On the other hand, the doctrine of duress
protects quite effectively the rights not of the victim alone but of both
parties without undue risk to either; for the only risk imposed on the
insurer by such litigation is, not the danger of a liability for damages,
but simply the possibility that it will have to return the premiums which
it secured by the wrongful pressure.
In other words, a finding of duress does not impose any legal for-
feiture on anyone, but simply requires a return of that which was im-
properly taken. This is a point often overlooked which, properly
understood, seriously weakens, not only the argument that mala fides is
essential to duress, but the whole position that there must be a threat
of an actionable wrong.
In working out the rules applicable to duress it is to be remembered
that we are dealing not with retributive nor even compensatory justice
so much as with restoratory justice. A judgment based on duress
simply requires the specific restitution of property to its former pos-
sessor, or the annulment of an executory contract, so as to undo a
transaction which should not have taken place. No affirmative liability
or heavy penalty of any sort is imposed on the guilty party2 ' and the
standard by which the wrong is measured may be correspondingly
lighter than that applied to the ordinary cases involving tort or breach
210 See Part I, pp. 273-4.
215 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) §1626; WOODWARD, QUAsI-CoN-
TRACTS (1913) §211. But if other remedies are inadequate, an affirmative liability
is sometimes recognized; Note (1925) 39 HARv. L. REv. 108. In News Publishing
Co. v. Associated Press et at., 114 Ill. App. 241 (1904), liability for damages was
imposed on the Associated Press, which was regarded as a public utility. Re-
covery of damages for duress was also allowed in White v. McCoy Land Co., 229
Mo. App. 1019, 87 S. W. (2d) 672 (1935), aff'd sib. nora., White v. Scarritt, 341
Mo. 1004, 111 S. W. (2d) 18 (1937).
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of contract.2 12 Considering this fact, and the decisions in cases where
threats of criminal prosecution or of guardianship proceedings were
used to attain personal ends as already discussed above213 it does not
seem sufficient to define a wrongful threat simply as one to commit an
actionable wrong. The term must include any threat to do an act
which, though quite lawful by technical legal standards, is yet an abuse
of the powers of the party making the threat; that is, any threat the
purpose of which was not to achieve the end for which the right, power,
or privilege was given.2 1
4
It has been suggested above that a threat to sue on a claim which
is unfounded but asserted in good faith may be wrongful, as the term
is here used. Will the test worked out in the preceding paragraph
support that conclusion? Is a claimant who sincerely believes in an
invalid claim and who threatens to take it into court, threatening to
abuse his power to sue? Under the test just stated, that depends upon
just how we define the purpose of our judicial system. If its true
purpose is to furnish all bona fide litigants a means of having their
rights determined, then the starting of an action in sincere though mis-
taken belief in the cause asserted is not a misuse of the courts nor an
abuse of the power to sue. But the only reason we open the courts to
any plaintiff who has no claim is that we cannot determine what his
rights are until he has come into court. The truly basic purpose of our
judicial system is to make possible the enforcement of just claims, 215
so that the threat of litigation where the opposite party has a meritoriQus
defense is used for an improper purpose; there is an abuse of power,
though possibly in perfect good faith. As pointed out above, the result
is not the imposition of any penalty on the party exercising the duress,
but simply the requirement that he restore that which he secured by the
unjust pressure. And since duress will be found only where the normal
remedy, resort to the law courts before the making of the contract or
payment, was practically beyond the reach of the victim, this application
of the doctrine enables the courts to right a wrong which, otherwise,
would probably not be set right at all.
The question of what is such a wrongful threat as to justify a find-
ing of duress has been, and will probably continue to be, settled by our
courts in accord with much more vague non-legal concepts than any
discussed so far. In fixing upon a measure of right and wrong for the
222 See Justice Holmes's discussion of the difference between the standards to be
applied in an action for damages, and an action for annulment of a contract for
duress, in Silsbee v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 380, 50 N. E. 555, 556 (1898).
.. See above, p. 349.
22' Note (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 274.
25 Even the modern declaratory judgment is fundamentally directed toward this
purpose, though it aims to achieve this end by action in advance of the breach of
obligation.
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present purpose, it is easy to consult too closely the rules governing
the technical rights of litigants in the normal tort and contract actions
and the "moral sense of the community" not enough.21 6  So the mere
fact that the dominant party did not insist upon an immediate decision,
but allowed the other time to consider his course of action,217 or the
reasonableness of the payment demanded on an unliquidated claim, 2 1 8
may be a factor aiding the court to find no duress. When an employer
found his clerk had been embezzling his money, and got a mortgage
from the young man's mother simply by threatening to tell the father,
who was neurotic and in danger of insanity according to the evidence,
the Massachusetts court held the claim of duress should go to the jury.
Mr. Justice Holmes explained that, though telling the father would not
be an actionable wrong, it was a "brutal and wicked" means used to get
the money; the basis of duress was defined in these broad terms:
"If a party obtains a contract by creating a motive from which the
other party ought to be free, and which in fact is and is known to be
sufficient to produce the results .... "219 (Italics not in original.)
The following statement from a Columbia Law Review note published
twenty years ago, is even more appropriate today:
"... the soundest way . . . to explain such cases (of duress by
threat of litigation) is on the ground that the doctrine of duress is still
in process of development, and that the prevailing notions of what con-
stitutes equitable and decent conduct furnish the basis for the legal
definition of duress."2 2 0  (Italics not in original.)
Very likely all the elements in the transaction will be considered and
the pressure used will be compared with what the court thinks is decent
conduct, which probably means that the standards generally prevailing
in the community will control.
But even this broad statement will not satisfactorily dispose of ill
the cases, for the "moral sense of the community" would not condemn
a claimant who, believing he was asserting his rights, threatened to sue
21". . . the practical end of the administration of justice according to law, is
such adjustment of the relations of men to each other and to society as conforms
to the moral sense of the community." Pound, The Need of a Sociological Juris-
prudence (1907) 19 GREEN BAG 607, 612.217The conduct of the dominant party in allowing time for consideration or
consultation with others apparently aided the courts in holding the transaction
voluntary in Cummins v. Carter et al., 17 Hawaii 71 (1905) ; Prichard v. Sharp,
51 Mich. 432, 16 N. W. 798 (1883); Cornwall v. Anderson et al., 85 Wash. 369,
148 Pac. 1 (1915).
218 McCrory Stores Corp. et al. v. S. M. Braunstein, Inc., 99 N. J. L. 166, 122
At. 814 (1923).
21' Silsbee v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 50 N. E. 555 (1898). Justice Holmes
explained that the court trusts its power of investigation for the purpose of restor-
ing the parties to the position they were in before the threat was made, but not
to the extent of enforcing an affirmative penalty or obligation on one of the parties.
2"0 Note (1920) 20 CoL. L. Rav. 80, 83.
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on an invalid claim; yet, if the present analysis is correct, sometimes
justice requires that such a threat be treated as sufficiently wrongful to
form a basis for a finding of duress. Though there is no moral taint
attached to the use of such a threat, it does place the victim under a
pressure from which he is entitled to be free,221 and the use is therefore
improper. The motives of the party using the threat may be above
reproach, but he does a real injustice to his adversary.
To the problem of what threats should be held wrongful within the
duress formula suggested, I find no answer which is even reasonably
definite and satisfactory. The only approach to a solution which my
analysis has reached suggests that any one of several different reasons
may be applied to make a threat so unjustifiable as to form a basis for
a claim of duress. Though there are probably exceptions, I believe the
cases and discussion indicate that, generally, a threat should be held
wrongful for the present purpose if it fits within any one of the follow-
ing descriptions:
(1) a threat to commit an actionable wrong ;22
(2) a threat to misuse a legal power given for other legitimate ends;
(3) a threat to maintain 'a lawsuit or defense which ultimately
proves to be unsustainable;
(4) a threat to violate the standards of decent conduct in the
community.
But, of course, in all these cases, such wrongfulness of the threat does
not of itself establish the claim of duress; inadequacy of remedy must
also be shown. And it is especially important here not to forget that,
even if the above statement does set out the substance of the present
law as to one element of non-physical duress, innovation is to be ex-
pected as the ideas of bench, bar, and laity develop in this comparatively
new field.
This wrongful threat must be a substantial factor, if not the con-
trolling factor, in inducing the agreement or payment by the victim.
Occasionally the facts indicate a threat, but indicate also that the vic-
tim's conduct was influenced primarily by factors other than the threat.
So, although a Tennessee conveyance was delivered for the Confederate
221 See quotation from Mr. Justice Holmes's decision in Silsbee v. Webber
above, p. 365.
222 Some courts would probably refuse to call wrongful the threat to break a
contract in the face of unforeseeable difficulties developing in the course of per-
formance; at any rate, modifications of the original contract secured by such a
threat have been enforced in some cases, though they have generally been discussed
as problems in consideration. Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67 Atl. 286 (1907).
Here the alternative remedy available to the promisee threatened with a breach
might well be inadequate for delay, and if the threat is wrongful the doctrine of
duress would apply. Or possibly the promise is to be interpreted as subject to an
implied condition excusing the promisor if such difficulties arise, in which case
there is no threat of breach.
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currency which was backed by threats from the controlling Confederate
regime of imprisonment for one rejecting it, the deed was held valid
and not given under duress for the reason that this form of money was
in general use in the community at the time; the court declared it found
no evidence that the threat was a controlling factor with the vendor.223
Some courts assume the same conclusion is justifiable where a license
fee is collected by a municipality under an invalid ordinance, and the
question is whether the mere existence in the ordinance of a penal pro-
vision is sufficient to indicate that the payment was induced by a
threat,224 although an implied threat seems clearly controlling; when a
citizen pays a license fee to government officials, it is surely reasonable
to assume that he is influenced largely by the fear that disobedience of
the law will involve some unpleasant personal consequences.
2. Inadequacy of Normal Legal Remedy
Even when the threat used was grievously wrongful, still relief for
economic duress is not generally given where such relief is not a prac-
tical necessity. The victim is expected to use any legal remedies open
to him against the threatened wrong which give his rights adequate
protection, rather than yield to the threat and later ask the courts for
a finding of duress. , It is not an aid to clarity of expression to pick
up an old phrase already overloaded with technical connotations in other
fields, and use it in quite new surroundings, where its purpose and
therefore its meaning, are likely to be different from anything here-
tofore connected with it; but "inadequacy of remedy" seems, in spite
of objections, the best phrase available to describe this element of duress.
The courts are understandably reluctant to approve new law in
cases where the old law, properly used, would have given practical
justice, and this is certainly one reason that "inadequacy of remedy"
is often regarded as essential to the application of this and other newly
developing legal doctrines. Aside from the innate conservatism of the
judiciary, there is some good reason for the limitation in dealing with
duress problems. For one thing, we quite justifiably like to have indi-
viduals settle their business affairs finally between themselves without
litigation whenever possible, and this makes us hesitate to overturn any
particular contract or payment under attack for duress. But it must
be admitted that the limitation here discussed, refusing relief for duress
because another remedy was available, in its effect on future business
"'Wilkerson v. Bishop et al., 47 Tenn. (7 Cold.) 24 (1869) (decision may
have been controlled by politics of the period just after the Civil War) ; accord,
Yates v. Royal Ins. Co., 200 111. 202, 65 N. E. 726 (1902), discussed in Part I,
p. 251.
2 Conley v. Buffalo, 65 Misc. Rep. 100, 119 N. Y. Supp. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
Contra: Hill v. District of Columbia, 18 D. C. (7 Mackey) 481 (1889) ; American
Steamship Co. v. Young, 89 Pa. 186 (1879).
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practices, will not so much restrict litigation as encourage resort to the
alternative available remedy, which will generally involve court action;
the only difference will be that the courts will be asked to intervene
before rather than after compliance with the demand.
A better reason for the limitation is that the victim who first sur-
renders to the threat and later seeks to annul the transaction for duress
is asking the court to disregard and set aside his own acts, done with
the deliberate intent that the other party should perform and rely on
them, after there has been such reliance. There may have been serious
wrong in the threat; but there is also something objectionable in the
shift of position by the victim between the time he yields to the pressure
and makes promise or payment and the time he subsequently attacks the
transaction in the courts for duress.22 5  If this inconsistency is not
forced upon the victim by the necessities of the situation as the only
means of self-protection, if readily available legal processes would have
prevented the execution of the threat or redressed appropriately the
wrong suffered, it is better to require the use of such other legal processes.
If the holder of a note with ample security takes a few shares of worth-
less stock in settlement simply because the maker refused to make any
other payment, a later attack on the settlement agreement as voidable
for duress does not deserve much sympathy. The holder of the note
gave a full discharge and allowed the maker to rely on it as final; it
should be final unless there were some further circumstances making it
impracticable for the holder to use his other remedy, some plausible
reason why he should hesitate to collect out of his security. Similarly,
the payment of a fine after conviction under an unconstitutional statute
was held not induced by duress for the reason that the victim had avail-
able a right of appeal, which he did not use.2 6
Many decisions apply the doctrine of economic compulsion without
making any express reference to inadequacy of remedy as an essential
element. Many others refuse to apply the doctrine although there was
plainly a wrongful threat and the remedy would be called inadequate by
almost any standard, as when a partner for a term threatened to dis-
solve the partnership in breach of the agreement, a breach for which
damages would almost certainly be inadequate compensation. 227  Pro-
fessor Williston is opposed to designating inadequacy of remedy as
essential to relief for duress, though he says it is always a matter for
pertinent inquiry.228
.25 See on p. 382, below, discussion of protest, which is intended to limit the
right of the prevailing party to rely on the finality of the transaction.
... Blumenthal v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 808 (S. D. Calif. 1925).
" Taylor v. Ford. 131 Calif. 440, 63 Pac. 770 (1901).
22'5 WILLISTON CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937), §1605, n. 2, §1620. See quotatior
and discussion below, pp. 380-1.
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The facts and holdings in the cases discussed in the preceding pages,
however, in my opinion, point to the sound rule as making inadequacy
of remedy an essential element, though often the decisions are silent on
the point. Many carefully phrased definitions of duress support the
same conclusion. The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
which has had considerable influence on later decisions, said:
"To constitute the coercion or duress which will be regarded as
sufficient to make a payment involuntary.., there must be some actual
or threatened exercise of power possessed, or believed to be possessed,
by the party exacting or receiving the payment over the person or prop-
erty of another, from which the latter has no other means of immediate
relief than by making the payment." (Italics not in original.) 229
Practically the same language is used to define duress in Woodward's
The Law of Quasi Contracts,230 and the same idea is expressed in other
decisions 231 and comments. =2
There are also a number of decisions which deny relief for duress
because the victim of a wrongful threat did not have to rely on the
normal common law remedy, but had ready to his hand an extraordinary
remedy which would have been an effective shield against the threat.
The lessee of the Marshall Field property in Chicago who yielded to
the lessor's unjustifiable threat to cancel the lease if the lessee did not
pay a part of the lessor's income tax, could, according to the court,
have secured an injunction; for that reason the court refused to find
duress. 233 The possibility of relief from a harassing threat of attach-
ment or other claim by posting a security bond has been treated as
affording sufficient means of protection to defeat an action based on
duress.234 These cases suggest that the development of a more effective
civil procedure hereafter might eliminate the necessity for the doctrine
Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U. S. 210 213, 24 L. ed. 409, 410 (187-7).
(1913) p. 337, §212.
231 The following decisions are notable among many which expressly recognize
this factor as of controlling importance. Strange v. Franklin et al., 126 Ga. 715,
55 S. E. 943 (1906) ; Manning v. Poling et al., 114 Iowa 20,83 N. W. 895 (1900),
aff'd on rehearing, 114 Iowa 20, .86 N. W. 30 (1901); Jones v. Sherwood Dis-
tilling Co., 150 Md. 24, 132 Atl. 278 (1926) (forceful discussion of adequacy of
remedy); Wessel v. D. S. B. Johnston Land & Mtge. Co., 3 N. D. 160, 54 N. W.
922 (1893) ; Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. Marie Ry. v. Railroad Commission of
Wisconsin, 183 Wis. 47, 197 N. W. 352 (1924).
' Notes (1937) 15 N. C. L. Ray. 413, (1916) 3 VA. L. RLy. 309, (1937) 3 U.
OF PiTr. L. REV. 241. Inadequacy of remedy is an essential element of duress, in
German law (or was, when the article cited was written); Dawson, Economic
Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law (1937) 12 TuL. L. Rv.42, 62.
233 Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Harvey, 335 IIl. 284, 167 N. E. 69 (1929),
case discussed Part I, p. 270.
... Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Feeney Tool Co., 97
Conn. 129, 115 AtI. 629 (1921); Forbes v. Appleton, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 115
(1849); Flack et al. v. National Bank of Commerce. 8 Utah 193. 30 Pac. 746(1892).
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of economic compulsion in some situations, and so might narrow the
field to which it is applied.
(a) Delay as Inadequacy of Remedy
The alternative remedy available generally involves litigation, and
litigation always involves delay; such delay is the common reason for
that inadequacy of remedy which completes a case of economic duress.
Usually months, and not uncommonly years, are consumed in getting
a final judgment and enforcing it. Probably the reason that economic
compulsion was earliest recognized in duress of goods cases, 2 5 and
where utility services were refused, 23 6 was partly because those were
the cases in which it was most obviously unreasonable to expect the
victim to suspend the enjoyment of his rights until the courts had passed
upon them. Where such daily necessities as utility services were in
question, it was plain to the courts a hundred years ago that the mere
loss of the service for the time necessary to establish the right thereto
in court would be a substantial injustice legally irretrievable, and con-
sequently that if this right was to be effectively protected the obligee
must be allowed to surrender to any conditions enforced by threat to
withhold the service, and to recover later on a claim of duress. 23 T
Nowadays, a wait of even a few weeks in collecting on a contract
claim is sometimes serious or fatal for an enterprise at a crisis in its
history. The business of a creditor in financial straits is at the mercy
of an unscrupulous debtor, who need only suggest that if the creditor
does not care to settle on the debtor's own hard terms, he can sue. This
situation, in which promptness in payment is vastly more important than
even approximate justice in the settlement terms, is too common in
modern business relations to be ignored by society and the courts.
The sale of land may depend upon immediate termination of an
outstanding interest or encumbrance held by one already under contract
with the proposed vendor, but wh6 refuses performance thereunder
unless some bonus is paid him.2 38 An employee whose wages have
been wrongfully garnisheed may face loss of employment unless the
claim is promptly settled.230 A debtor may refuse timely payment of
money imperatively necessary to enable the creditor to meet his own
pressing obligations.240 The threat may be to refuse delivery on a
"', Part I, p. 241.
211 Part I, p. 243. " Part I, p. 245.
2" Bonus to vendor held collected by duress: Pemberton v. Williams, 87 Ill. 15
(1877); see Congdon v. Preston, 49 Mich. 204, 206, 13 N. W. 516, 517 (1882).
Contra: Mutual Sales Agency v. Honi, 145 Wash. 236, 259 Pac. 712 (1927). Bonus
to mortgagee held collected by duress: Wells v. Adams et aL.. 88 Mo. App. 220
(1901): First National Bank v. Sargeant. 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 595 (1902).
Contra: Crittenden v. Royce, 100 Conn. 617, 124 Ati. 215 (1924).
... Kelley v. Osborn et al., 86 Mo. App. 239 (1900).2' Winget v. Rockwood et aL, 69 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 8th,' 1934) ; Thomas
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contract for goods necessary to continuance of the buyer's business.241
An attorney may threaten to abandon his client in the midst of liti-
gation,242 or an actor may refuse to proceed with a performance already
advertised.2 43  Submission may be necessary to enable the victim to
carry out plans for an important shipment of merchandise.244 A pay-
ment of an illegal head tax on immigrants before they were landed
from the payor's ship was held involuntary; but the same court on the
same day held such a payment made after the immigrants were landed
was voluntary, giving as a reason that the danger of the payor's ship
being held up by litigation over the tax was eliminated.2 45  Even in
the absence of unusual circumstances, making any delay abnormally
costly, if the delay attending court action promises to be of un-
usual length, it may involve sufficient hardship to make the remedy
inadequate.2 4
6
(b) Uncertainty of Remedy as Inadequacy
Not only the delay involved in securing court action, but sometimes
the mere uncertainty as to what the court action will be makes it un-
reasonable to expect the victim to rely exclusively on the courts for
protection.247 The excessive fee collected by the Missouri Public Serv-
ice Commission for its approval of a railroad bond issue was ordered
refunded, in a case already discussed, because the United States Supreme
Court felt the railroad was under no obligation to take the risk of an
unfavorable decision ;248 the danger involved in proceeding without the
et al. v. Brown, 116 Va. 233, 81 S. E. 56 (1914) ; see other cases discussed Part
I, pp. 255 ff.
241 Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Hollingshead & Blei, 202 I1. App. 177 (1916);
Secor v. Ardsley Ice Co., 133 App. Div. 136, 117 N. Y. Supp. 414 (2d Dep't 1900),
aff'd mere., 201 N. Y. 603, 95 N. E. 1139 (1911) (by implication). Contra: Goebel
v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N. W. 284 (1882); and other cases discussed Part I,
pp. 262 ff.
242 Cooley et al. v. Buie et ux., 284 S. W. 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'd 291
S. W. 876 (Tex. Com. App. 1927) (upper court found no proof of threat to
abandon case).
-"'Dana v. Kemble, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 545 (1836).
21" Darling-Singer Lumber Co. v. Oriental Navigating Co., 127 Ore. 155, 259
Pac. 420 (1928), rehearing denied, 127 Ore. 155, 272 Pac. 275 (1929); Jones v.
Sherwood Distilling Co., 150 Md. 24, 132 Atl. 278 (1926).
"' Cunningham v. Munroe, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 471 (1860) (paid before land-
ing; held, duress) ; Cunningham v. Boston, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 468 (1860) (paid
after landing; held, no duress). Contra: Benson et al. v. Monroe, 61 Mass. (7
Cush.) 125 (1851).
211 James Shewan & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 73 Ct. C1. 49 (1931) (court
emphasized long delay involved in securing enabling act giving court jurisdiction,
and a delay of some years before case could be heard, as showing inadequacy of
alternative remedy). In De Luca v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 262 (1930), cert.
denied. 283 U. S. 862, 51 S. Ct. 36, 75 L. ed. 763 (1930), the court refused relief in
a similar situation, partly because there -was no showing that the delay would be
disastrous, and partly because of defective pleading.217 5 WILLISTON., CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) §1620, p. 4531, n. 7 and cases cited.
248 Union Pacific R. R. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 248 U. S.
67, 39 S. Ct. 24, 63 L. ed. 131 (1918), discussed in Part I, pp. 248-9.
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formal approval and relying on successful litigation to settle the legality
of the bond issue was so great as to make that course impracticable-an
inadequate remedy. The same court gave the same reason for allowing
recovery of taxes paid under an invalid statute which provided that
defaulting corporations would forfeit the right to do business in the
state.249 Stockholders who paid an assessment under protest, claiming
it illegal, were held entitled to recovery because the court said they acted
reasonably to avoid loss of the stock.250 A shipment of wax, rejected
by a purchaser as not meeting contract specifications, was returned to
the seller with a draft attached to the bill of lading for a sum claimed
by the purchaser as damages for breach of the sale contract. To get
possession and prevent loss of the wax, which was perishable, the seller
paid the draft, and brought suit to force refund from the buyer. The
court held the payment involuntary and allowed recovery, saying there
was no breach of contract by the seller, but he did not have to permit
destruction of the goods and risk all his investment in the transaction
on ability to prove that fact in court.25
Of course uncertainty, even in a high degree, as to the outcome of
a lawsuit, does not always make that remedy inadequate. Rather it is
so only in the abnormal situation where a much heavier risk of loss in
case of 'unfavorable outcome is carried by one party than by the other;
a heavier risk of loss, that is. not in that the chances of loss are greater
on the one side than on the other, but in that the penalty paid by one
party if he loses will be much greater than the penalty imposed on the
other party if the other party loses. Though the courts do not all
agree, an apparently perfect example of such uncertainty is found in
those cases already referred to involving disputes over the obligation
to pay insurance premiums. The insured alleges disability and relies
on a premium waiver clause, while the insurer threatens cancellation for
default. Suppose the individual is stubborn, refuses payment, and re-
sorts to a lawsuit. If the insurer loses the case, it will have to perform
its insurance contract, without any increase of liability because of the
lawsuit. But if the individual loses he will have lost, not only his hope
of escaping the payment of the premiums, but also all chance of pro-
tecting his investment by performing the contract. Practically all his
long accumulated rights in the insurance policy will have been forfeited
by the delay,252 and this may be just at a time when his illness or partial
2,9 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 32 S. Ct. 216,
56 L. ed. 436 (1912).
"' Young v. Hoagland et al., 212 Calif. 426, 298 Pac. 996 (1931).
25. Carhill Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Ennis-Bayard Petroleum Co., 81 Pa. Super.
486 (1923).
252 Under modern policy forms, extended insurance or a small paid-up policy
or cash surrender value would be left.
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disability has made it impossible for him to secure insurance protection
elsewhere.253  So if the right of the Missouri Public Service Commis-
sion to the excessive fee for authorizing a railroad bond isstie had been
litigated before payment, the railroad would have risked much more in
the action than the commission; failure to collect the fee would not
have mattered greatly to the state, but a finding against the legality of
the large bond issue, or the delay of the issue pending the litigation,
might have been ruinous for the railroad. The Illinois court in the case
already referred to, involving the leasehold on the Marshall Field store
property in Chicago, indicated it would have found duress were it not
for the availability of an injunction as a protection to the lessee against
forfeiture.2 54  Assuming that a temporary restraining order would be
procurable to preserve the status quo in the dispute and prevent loss
pending the decision of the injunction suit, it seems fair to conclude
that the Illinois lessee's remedy was sufficient to protect him. This
suggests that uncertainty of remedy is merely a special phase of delay
in litigation as a basis for claiming inadequacy of the remedy.
The idea that uncertainty of the remedy makes it inadequate is
contrary to the implications of many decisions and has been expressly
repudiated in some. A stockholder paid a bonus, not legally collectible,
to participate in a new issue of stock by his corporation; his suit, fifty
years ago, to force a refund failed.
"We may concede that the action of the company placed him in a
'dilemma'; he had to choose between two roads, neither of which he
may have regarded as safe. In other words, he was uncertain as to his
legal rights under the scheme proposed by the company. The
'dilemma' was the uncertainty of the law.... However great the uncer-
tainty of the law may be in particular cases, it has never been supposed
to amount to duress of person or goods."2-55
More recently the New Jersey court refused relief to a lessee who had
paid money not properly due on demand of the lessor rather than risk
forfeiture of the valuable leasehold on determination of a doubtful issue,
the tax liability of the lessee, in a lower court trial subject to somewhat
narrowly limited right of review.256 But these decisions appear to have
little to recommend them except adherence to tradition. The rule which
. Part I, pp. 273-4.
Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Harvey, 335 II. 284, 167 N. E. 69 (1929),
discussed in Part I, pp. 269-70.
'" De La Cuesta v. Insurance Co. of N. A., 136 Pa. 62, 83, 20 At. 505, 508
(1890). The court did point out a remedy which would have protected the stock-
holder's rights -here, suit against the corporation for market value of the stock; so
the statement quoted in the text above may be dictum. Another case expressly
repudiating the idea that uncertainty means inadequacy of remedy is Wessel v.
D. S. B. Johnston Land & Mtge. Co., 3 N. D. 160, 54 N. W. 922 (1893).
"' McCrory Stores Corp. et al. v. S. M. Braunstein, Inc., 99 N. J. L. 166, 122
Atl. 814 (1923).
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treats uncertainty as inadequacy in accord with the decisions referred
to above will probably appeal to the courts as a means of avoiding
excessive risks for either party while giving reasonable protection to
both.
(c) Compromise Agreements and Economic Duress
The last few paragraphs bring sharply into the foreground the fact
that the doctrine of economic compulsion is not always easy to reconcile
with our traditional policy favoring compromise agreements made to
avoid lawsuits. Finality of settlement, especially without the trouble
and expense of litigation, is often more important to society and to the
parties than attaining a perfect balance in the scales of justice. And it
is precisely where there is uncertainty about the rights of the parties
that compromise settlements are particularly to be encouraged as most
satisfactory to courts and disputants; yet the preceding paragraphs have
put forward the proposition that the uncertainty of the rights of the
parties may be one reason for overturning the agreement made in ad-
vance of litigation.
The recognition of duress by economic pressure in most cases does
appear inconsistent with the doctrine that a settlement of a dispute
negotiated with full knowledge of the facts should be treated as final.
Of course there must be a bona fide difference of opinion as to the
rights involved; if the dominant party urged his claim knowing it was
invalid, he is practicing blackmail, and the resulting agreement will not
be protected by the courts as a compromise.2 . 7  In many of the cases
the rule as to compromises might seem inapplicable because the trans-
action under attack is not the result of mutual concessions; one party
finds he can, and does, enforce his demand one hundred per cent. In
conversational English we would not call such a settlement a compro-
mise, but the law does not seem to require any "give and take" from
both sides in a settlement agreement to make it final ;258 the essential
thing is the consent of the parties with knowledge of the facts. It is
true the agreement must be "voluntary"; but to call such an agreement
- 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) §135.
28 In the following cases the court rejected the claim of duress largely because
the settlement under attack was entitled to protection as a compromise, though
there was no concession from the prevailing party. Craig v. Frauenthal, 145
Ark. 185, 224 S. W. 434 (1920); Springfield & Memphis R. R. v. Allen, 46 Ark.
217 (1885) ; .McCormick v. St. Louis, 166 Mo. 315, 65 S. W. 1038 (1901). Some
peppercorn, if not a reasonably substantial concession, might well be required
before the settlement is entitled to protection, as a compromise, against the claim
of duress. If there was no diminution of his claim, the prevailing party has been
quite blind to any possible element of reasor in his adversary's position, has had,
at the time of the settlement, such complete confidence in the righteousness and
strength of his own case as to refuse to make any concession. That being so, is it
so hard on him, in the later action on duress, to restrict his argument to the merits
of his original claim, refusing him recourse to the theory of compromises?
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involuntary simply because one party threatened to do what he thought
he had a right to do would be, as many courts see the problem, to
unsettle all compromise agreements, making it practically impossible
for parties to settle their differences out of court. This attitude, that
the argument of duress must fail because the transaction was a settle-
ment made with full knowledge of the facts, is often expressed259 and
in many other cases a matter of more or less subconscious implication.
But economic duress can be recognized without affecting settlements
properly negotiated. Compromise agreements are not untouchably
sacred; they are subject to the same defenses as other contracts-fraud,
mistake, and duress.2 60  It is closing our eyes to plain fact to deny that,
like other contracts, they may be secured either by pressure which is
quite unobjectionable or, on the other hand, by unfair, anti-social pres-
sure. Our deep-rooted partiality for compromises is sound, for the
parties making them are usually influenced simply by the risks of going
to trial, risks which are substantially equal for both except as they are
affected by the respective merits of the opposing contentions, and that
inequality is unobjectionable. This pressure does not indicate economic
duress, and should be allowed its full influence. We want disputants
to turn to the courts only as a last resort; we want them to weigh
their chances, the possibility of success and the possibility of defeat, and
to try to settle their disputes by a payment suitably proportioned to
those chances. This does not mean that we have to support a com-
promise settlement secured by exploiting the abnormal type of uncer-
tainty described above,2 61 where the risk of loss is disproportionately
heavy on one party, not because of the merits of the controversy, but
because the one party stands to lose a considerable property right if
unsuccessful, while the other would lose very little if the decision went
against him. The rule favoring compromises should not be pushed to
the point of encouraging one party to take advantage of a situation
"I (Where this argument was made in spite of inadequacy of remedy, as that
phrase is here used, the fact is noted.) McKenzie-Hague Co. v. Carbide & Carbon
Chemicals Corp., 73 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (remedy inadequate);
Manigault v. S. M. Ward & Co. et al., 123 Fed. 707, 718 (C. C. S. C. 1903):
Shirey v. Beard, 62 Ark. 621, 37 S. W. 309 (1896) ; Stover v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 213
(1867); Kiler v. Wohletz, 79 Kan. 716, 101 Pac. 474 (1909); Shelby v. Bowman,
64 Kan. 879, 68 Pac. 1131 (1902) (remedy inadequate); Prichard v. Sharp, 51
Mich. 432, 16 N. W. 798 (1883); Perkins v. Trinka, 30 Minn. 241, 15 N. W. 115
(1883) ; State ex rel. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v.
Shain et al., 98 S. W. (2d) 597 (Mo. 1936) (remedy inadequate),; McCormick v.
St. Louis, 166 Mo. 315, 65 S. W. 1038 (1901) (remedy inadequate) ; Wolfe et al.
v. Marshall et al., 52 Mo. 167 (1873) (remedy inadequate) ; Pearl v. Whitehouse,
52 N. H. 254 (1872) ; Gunter v. Thomas, 36 N. C. 199 (1840) ; Heysham v. Dettre,
89 Pa. 506 (1879) ; Natcher v. Natcher, 47 Pa. 496 (1864) ; see Secor et al. v.
Clark, 117 N. Y. 350, 354, 22 N. E. 754, 755 (1889). See also cases cited in note
258 above.
.00 KEENER, QUAsi-CoNTRACTS (1893) 30.
201 See above, p. 372.
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where he has comparatively little to lose, whatever the outcome of the
lawsuit, while his adversary runs a chance of forfeiting a large capital
investment; or a situation in which he could wait comfortably several
months or years if necessary for the court to pass on the claim, while
a delay of a few weeks would cause his adversary a large loss.
Attempted settlements of tort claims sometimes exemplify the use
of means which should be condemned on some theory, and which fit
nicely into the definition of economic duress. After a railroad wreck,
the company's adjuster hurries around and reaches the injured party
while he is still in a hospital far from home, to offer.him his choice be-
tween payment of hospital expenses incurred, transportation home, and
a generous extra hundred dollars or so, or being left with his right to
sue the company, but without immediate resources, separated from all
his 'family, on a hospital bed, until the management, as the adjuster
remarks, puts him out for non-payment of bills. In the case described,
the court said the jury might find duress. 2 2 This is plainly a bonla fide
dispute; the liability of the railroad is unliquidated and uncertain, and
they may quite honestly deny owing the passenger any money. If this
uncertainty as to the recovery on a suit against the company had been
the only factor which led the passenger to consent to the settlement, it
should not be interfered with. But the facts made, it plain that the
company was able to push the agreement through on its own terms be-
cause the injured party could not wait for court action; that remedy
would not meet his pressing need for immediate funds. The same
reason for putting aside the settlement reached in this and some other
tort cases20 3 is applicable with as much logical force, though with less
emotional appeal, to settlements of contract claims where the pressure
was not limited to the usual uncertainty as to what a court of law will
do to the parties, but there was also in the picture the fact that one
party was much better situated to wait for the court to pass on the
dispute than was the other.2
6 4
22 Buford v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 82 Ky. 286 (1884) (court said con-
tract might be voidable, not for "technical duress," but because victim's distress
interfered with free exercise of his judgment). Contra: State ex rel. Order of
United Commercial Travelers of America v. Shain et al., 98 S. W. (2d) 597 (Mo.
1936) (settlement of insurance claim). In McCoy v. James T. McMahon Con-
struction Co., 216 S. W. 270 (Mo. 1919), the court said there was no duress in a
settlement thus secured, and also that spending the money after the victim had
left the hospital would have affirmed the release if it had been voidable for duress.
... Whitney v. Eager, 29 Fed. Cas., No. 17584, at 1073 (E. D. Pa. 1841);
Thomas v. McDaniel, 14 Johns. 185 (N. Y. 1817). Both of the above decisions
reiused to recognize releases of tort claims, forced from seamen at time of
discharge. Admiralty courts have long recognized the necessity of protecting the
common seaman against the ship's master, who was liable to abuse his power.
" See, for example, Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Hollingshead & Blei. 202 Ill. App,
177 (1916) ; First National Bank v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594. 91 N. W. 595 (1902):
Darling-Singer Lumber Co. v. Oriental Navigating Co., 127 Ore. 655, 272 Pac. 275
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Humanitarian considerations are not all in favor of overturning
these tort settlements and other agreements attacked for duress where
the threat was to refuse payment of money owed, or performance of
some other affirmative obligation, and the remedial inadequacy is based
partly on delay. If the tort-feasor had not made the settlement in ques-
tion but had taken the course our conclusion tends to encourage, leaving
the claim to be asserted in the normal lawsuit, the immediate hardship on
the victim would probably have been greatly increased. He would suffer
all the delays of litigation without any alleviation at all by even a partial
earlier payment. The tort-feasor who forces a cheap. settlement on its
victim and then defends it on the ground that it paid a small part of its
debt promptly rather than waiting to be sued for the whole, does not de-
serve much sympathy from the court in its own behalf. But the effect of
the rule upon future practices is a distinct and troublesome problem; the
precedent finding duress serves as notice to tort-feasors to make no
settlement until after the victim's pressing need for money is past. This
does not seem sensible; our jurisprudence must recognize the instability
of modern life, abounding in situations where a few hours or days are
worth many thousands of dollars. What we need is a rule or code that
will encourage settlements reasonable in the time of payment as well
as in the other terms insisted upon, or a more speedy remedial system,
or both. We cannot now set up any more definite standard than that
of reasonableness; the best we can do is to ask our courts to test com-
promise agreements entered into in a time of stress for one of the parties
by that uncertain measure. A settlement which is -fair and reasonable
to both parties, considering not only the amount paid but the promptness
of the payment, should not be overturned for duress, any more than
payments actually owed are recoverable for duress. 2 5  On the other
hand, the obligor should not be allowed to take advantage of the pro-
verbial delays of legal procedure, i.e., of the inadequacy of the only
remedy available, in order to force consent to an unreasonably low
settlement figure.2
66
(d) Other Bases for Claiming Remedy Inadequate
Delay and uncertainty are the principal reasons given for inadequacy
of the normal legal remedy, but not the only ones. The damages col-
lectible if a threat. to break a contract or other obligation is carried out
may be so limited by established rules as not to be even reasonably
(1929). Practically all findings of duress involve the overthrow of an agreement
made with full knowledge of the facts.
2" RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §495, Comment a.
-' Possibly something could be done to encourage reasonably prompt settle-
ments by allowing higher interest, or even punitive damages, in the discretion of
the court, where the victim was left in severe hardship because of delay.
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compensatory.26 7 Or it may be that the wrongdoer is judgment proof
so that no collection could be expected even if a judgment were ob-
tained.268 Or a particular remedy might be effective enough, but
beyond the reach of the victim because of the expense involved. This
last suggestion was advanced as a basis for inadequacy in a Texas court,
but held insufficient to show duress.2 69 And there are a number of
cases where the courts have called a remedy which involved posting a
surety bond adequate, without any reference to evidence that the victim
had the means to secure such a bond.270 Yet in many of the cases
where delay was.treated as making the normal remedy inadequate, the
only reason the delay was serious was because the victim was in a
financial crisis,271 which is but another way of saying his means were
so limited that he could not afford to wait. There is good authority,
then, that the adequacy of the remedy is dependent partly on the finan-
cial position of the victim of the threat.
(e) Definition of Inadequacy of Remedy
The sensible view recognized by inference at least in many of the
decisions referred to above, is that a remedy which is not practicable
for the victim of the threat is not adequate; if resort to the ordinary
lawsuit will not "do his business," to use the trenchant phrase of the
early decision on duress of goods, 2 7 2 he should not be expected to rely
on it. Inequality of economic or bargaining power is often mentioned
by the courts as an element in this type of duress ;273 and such inequality
-7 Hazelhurst Oil Mill & Fertilizing Co. v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 331 (Ct.
Cl. 1930) ; Niedermeyer v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 61 Mo. App.
654 (1895). If economic duress be regarded as an innovation at the common law,
it might be asked why the innovation might not as well come by liberalizing the
rules as to measure of damages. Probably we should protect the victim and not
make him gamble on which innovation the court would approve, that is, make
both remedies available, at least until one or the other is well-established law.
."s Miller v. Eisele et al., 111 N. J. L. 268, 168 Atl. 426 (1933). In Domenico
et al. v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 112 Fed. 554 (N. D. Calif. 1901), the argument
was made that the victim yielded to the demands which were backed up by threat
of breach of contract because he feared the wrongdoers would not be able to pay
damages for the breach; and this point the court uses to support its conclusion
that the promise of a bonus thus secured was reasonable and should be enforced.
2" Sanborn v. Bush et al., 41 Tex. Civ. App. 24, 91 S. W. 883 (1906).
.0- See cases cited in note 234 above. An Arkansas complaint alleging threat
to sue on an illegal claim when the victim did not have the money necessary to
secure a bond and resist the litigation, was held insufficient to set up a cause of
action for recovery of money paid under duress; Satchfield v. Laconia Levee
District, 74 Ark. 270, 85 S. W. 409 (1905).
_' See cases cited above, notes 157, 158, and 240.
Astley v. Reynolds. 2 Strange 915, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K. B. 1732), discussed
in Part I, p. 241.
"I Marshall v. Lovell, 19 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Mobile and Mont-
gomery Ry. v. Steiner, McGehee & Co., 61 Ala. 559 (1878) ; New Orleans & North-
eastern R. R. v. Louisiana Construction & Improvement Co., 109 La. 13, 33 So. 51
(1902). See also cases cited in Part I. p. 247, n. 32; Note (1927) 27 COL. L. REV.
430.
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is usually traceable to the inability of the victim to defend himself
immediately against the threatened wrong by court action. If the bar-
gaining powers of the parties do show a marked inequality, not because
of the merits of their respective claims, but because the only legal rem-
edy presently available to one is seriously disadvantageous to him under
the existing conditions, the remedy should be called inadequate.
A number of decisions, especially on collection of illegal license
fees, hold there is no duress where penalties are not collectible without
suit, which is to say that defense in ordinary litigation is always an
adequate protection against the wrongful threat ;274 these decisions are
plainly inconsistent with the theory here advanced. It is the business
of our legal system to give effective protection against any wrong;
assuring a hearing in court before ultimate determination of a dispute
is impqrtant, but not always sufficient, to that end. Any limitation of
remedies by preconceived arbitary rules designed to meet general situa-
tions smacks of the technicality of the old common law. The law
prescribing the type of relief available to the victim of a wrong should
be not fixed and arbitrary, but flexible, as flexible and adaptable to
unusual situations as is human ingenuity in devising new means of
exerting pressure on other humans.
There is no danger of going too far in this matter of remedial
adequacy. We shall have to be careful in determining what threats are
wrongful; for in this we are setting a limitation on individual freedom
of contract, which we still hope to protect in large part. It is good to
raise our standards of business conduct, so long as we do not lower the
standard of reward for honest individual industry. But so far as this
second element in the problem is concerned, it is difficult to see how we
can make the remedy for a wrong too effective. Granted a wrong is
threatened, it should be prevented or remedied as effectively as our
ingenuity can be made to operate to that end. The legal remedy then,
to be adequate, should be effective and practicable, as efficient a means
of protection against the wrong as the remedy based on duress.27 -
(f) Adequacy of Remedy and the Subjective Theory of Duress
We have congratulated ourselves on the liberal trend toward what
we called a subjective rather than the old objective test for duress;
'7' Craig v. Frauenthal, 145 Ark. 185, 224 S. W. 434 (1920) ; City of Muscatine
v. Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co., 45 Iowa 185 (1876); Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill 425 (Md. 1846) ; Cook et al. v. Boston,
91 Mass. (9 Allen) 393 (1864).
... The closest approach to this standard I have found is in a decision refusing
to find any duress because no threat was proved to have been made. The court
said, however, "In order to recover back on the ground of . . . duress, compliance
with the illegal demand must be the more effective and practical remedy of the
party," Hadley v. Farmers' National Bank of Oklahoma City, 125 Okla. 250, 252,
257 Pac. 1101, 1102 (1927).
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most courts look now not for such pressure as would overcome the will
of ordinary firmness, but simply for pressure which did overcome the
will of the victim in the transaction under scrutiny. Objections to the
underlying theorem, that the normal contract results from a will that is
quite free, have been set out in the opening paragraphs of this article.270
It is this same liberalizing tendency which established the subjective
test, which has pushed judicial opinion toward recognition of duress by
economic pressure.27 7 Yet according to the present analysis, one of
the essential elements of relievable economic duress is an 'inadequate
remedy"; and that phrase certainly sounds very impersonal and ob-
jective, like a reversion away from the modern subjective standard.
So the leading treatise on contract law includes this statement about
inadequacy of remedy as an essential element in duress:
"Analogous to the idea that threats must be such as to terrify a
man of ordinary firmness is a rule not infrequently stated that if the
law provides adequate redress or compensation for the injury threat-
ened, the threat will not amount to duress. Indeed, the only reason
which could be given for such a rule is that a threat of this sort should
not terrify a person of resolution. But, though such statements are
still repeated, the rule is artificial, and, so far as it would require a person
threatened with injury necessarily to endure the injury because the law
provides a remedy for it, cannot be accepted. 278
Thus Professor Williston uses language which seems directly opposed
to the present analysis of the problem, directly opposed to "inadequacy
of remedy" as a factor in duress of any type. Yet the whole body of
case-law, in the decisions, for instance, on duress of goods, 2 9 and
duress by public utilities,280 where the doctrine of economic duress is
well established, leaves no doubt even on a casual reading that the
court has almost always been influenced by the inability of the victim
to secure reasonable relief against the threatened wrong except through
some theory of duress.
If Professor Williston's statement quoted above be studied in its
context, however, it will appear to refer to remedial inadequacy tested
objectively, tested without regard to the situation of the individual con-
cerned. His objection is that if we deny relief for duress where there
is an adequate remedy available, we add a limitation so impersonal and
objective as practically to nullify the subjective test of duress. But
whether it has that effect depends on the meaning given to the phrase.
If we test adequacy of the remedy by its effectiveness to meet the needs
2" Part I, pp. 238-40.
' "'Durfee. Recovery of Money Paid under Duress of Legal Proceedings in
MichiganWIlch v. Beeching (1917) 15 MICH. L. Rav. 228, 238; note (1934) 3
Wis. L. REv. 59. 61-62.
5 WILLISTON. CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) 4529, §1620; see also id. §1605, n. 2.
-7 Part 1, pp. 241-3. 80 Part I, pp. 243-6.
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of the particular individual in question, it becomes very personal and
subjective; and that is exactly what the better decisions do. Professor
Williston's later statements in the same section quoted above are con-
sistent with the theory that the courts should, and generally do, deny
relief for duress where a remedy adequate by a personalized subjective
test was available. The sentence immediately following the statement
quoted above reads:
"The inquiry must always be pertinent whether under all the cir-
cumstance" of each case the remedy is adequate, aid the mere fact that it
cannot be made effective immediately will often make it inadequate."2 81
Consequently the better rule in such cases is that delay makes the remedy
inadequate, if the victim is in such a situation that he will suffer irrep-
arable injury while waiting for the courts to act;282 and this seems to
give a subjective definition to the phrase "adequate remedy." A few
sentences later in the same section, Professor Williston says:
"Even where the remedy at law would be fully adequate were the
payor sure of his rights, there may be duress in the very uncertainty of
his position. Thus where an insurance contract relieves the insured
from paying premiums when he is totally disabled, and there is dispute
as to the extent of his injury, payment of the premiums under threat
of forfeiture of his policy is made under duress, even though he would
be fully protected if he refused to make the payments and rested on his
questionable legal rights.' '2s8
If this uncertainty is recognized as making the remedy inadequate-and
that seems a reasonable explanation of some decisions 2 4-then we are
again simply testing the remedy by the needs of the individual concerned.
In the same section, Professor Williston states that there is a degree of
remedial adequacy which will suffice to bar the claim of duress.
"The case may be distinguished where the law will not simply give
compensation for a wrong, but will preveit it.'
1285
It seems to come down to a question of definition of adequacy of rem-
edy; when the phrase is broadened out much beyond the old chancery
definition, somewhat along the lines suggested in VAiilliston's treatise
and in the preceding pages, it may be used in the definition of duress,
as set out above, quite consistently with the subjective theory of duress.
One difficulty has not been dealt with in the cases to any large
extent; suppose a threatened victim has an adequate remedy but does
not know it? The defect in such a case would not be in the remedy
.S.5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) 4529, §1620.
... See above, p. 370.
2" 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) 4531, §1620.
... See above, p. 371.
. 5 WILLTSTON, CONaRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) 4532, §1620.
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but in the victim's knowledge of it; so the remedy could not be called
inadequate; but among the few decisions which seem to have dealt with
such a situation, several have allowed relief for duress. 280 Certainly a
mere personal dislike of litigation is not likely to be held sufficient to
justify the court in giving relief or in calling the remedy inadequate;
the subjective test of inadequacy would hardly be carried to that point.287
M. PROTEST AND LACHES
There are other factors which should be given some consideration
in duress problems, but which are seldom of much importance. Protest,
or lack of it, is generally a secondary matter, when referred to at all.2
Express protest, especially in cases where the victim's reluctance is not
otherwise obvious, strengthens the claim of duress by giving notice to
the prevailing party that the victim submitted because of the pressure
put upon him, which may be treated as timely implied iotice that the
transaction is not to be relied on as final. But protest must not be
required, because the same pressure which forces payment or promise
may also force the withdrawal or omission of an express protest. It
would also be a mistake to rely too heavily on an expression of protest
as indicating duress, because such expression may become a mere
formality. In border line cases, protest may play an important part; the
more wrongful the threat, and the more obvious the reluctance of the
victim, the less reason there is in the dominant party's reliance on the
victim's acquiescence as voluntary and final, and so the weaker the
argument for requiring protest as a condition of relief. 289
It is also true that the more promptly a claim is asserted after the
pressure is relieved, the better its chance of success. If the remedy
sought is equitable, or probably if it is quasi-contractual,2 90 delay raises
2. Hollingsworth v. Stone, 90 Ind. 244 (1883) ; Link et al. v. Aiple-Hemmel-
man Real Estate Co., 182 Mo. App. 531, 165 S. W. 832 (1914); Fraser et al. v.
Pendlebury, 31 L. J. C. P. (N. S.) 1 (1861). Contra: Illinois Merchants Trust
Co. v. Harvey, 335 Ill. 284, 167 N. E. 69 (1929) ; Manning v. Poling et al., 114
Iowa 20, 83 N. W. 95 (1900), aff'd on rehearing, 114 Iowa 20, 86 N. W. 30 (1901).
2" See cases cited above, note 148.
2" Protest has played a larger part in cases involving claims against govern-
mental units, such as tax cases and excessive license fee cases, than in duress
cases generally. See the discussion in Part I, p. 252. It has been referred to as
evidence, not conclusive, of duress; Koewing v. Town of West Orange, 89 N. 3. L.
539, 99 Atl. 203 (1916) ; Miller v. Eisele et al., 111 N. J. L. 268, 168 Atl. 426
(1933). In White v. T. W. Little Co. et al., 118 Wash. 582, 204 Pac. 186 (1922),
relief for duress was denied because of lack of protest; and protest influenced the
court to find duress in Maskell v. Homer [1915] 3 K. B.'106.
.89 See the discussion in 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) §1623; also
cases cited holding protest not necessary, in Part I of this article, p. 252, note 52.
2" See the nature of the remedy discussed in 5 WIu.ISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.
ed. 1937) §§1626, 1627B. That laches is a defense to quasi-contractual claims gen-
erally, see WOODvARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913) §31. In News Publishing Co. v.
Associated Press et al., 114 Ill. App. 241 (1904), the victim succeeded in avoiding
the dominant party's claim of laches by bringing an action for damages for duress
-an unusual form of relief.
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the possibility of laches as a defense,2 9' especially if there has been a
change of position by the other party in reliance on the finality of the
transaction.2 2 On this issue also an express protest to the dominant
party will be a substantial help to the duress claim; for probably after
such a notice it would take a longer delay to constitute fatal laches.
N. EFFECT OF DOCTRINE ON LITIGATION
The argument has been made by conservative courts that litigation
will be increased by extending the concept of duress to include economic
compulsion. 29 3 Prediction either way on this point is absolutely safe,
quite unrestrained by any danger of being proved erroneous; the forces
involved cannot be measured even after the event. But the denial of
relief for economic compulsion will not always operate to prevent liti-
gation ;294 it will serve to increase the pressure on the victim to resist
to the utmost when the threat is made, and such resistance will fre-
quently mean litigation at that time. Many of the disputes concerned
in these cases are such that final settlement is hardly to be expected
without court action, in any event; and the only question is whether
the lawsuit will come before or after submission to the threat. A clear
approval of either rule by the courts tends to reduce litigation by en-
abling one party or the other to see in advance the futility of court
action. In the final analysis, it is probably the certainty and objectivity
of the applicable law which tends most markedly to cut down litigation;
and it is probably true that the rule denying relief for economic com-
pulsion is susceptible of much more definite and objective delimitation
than is the rule allowing relief. To this extent the argument that the
doctrine will increase litigation is justified; and we shall have to deter-
mine whether such increase of litigation pays for itself as set out in the
preceding pages, in an increase in effective remedies against wrong,
which is the purpose for which our courts and judicial processes exist.
Obviously the doctrine does tend to postpone the parties' resort to
judicial tribunals until after a temporary submission by the victim, and
this effect has been urged as a serious argument against the whole con-
cept of economic duress. Courts have said that it would be most unjust
to permit the victim of a threat to surrender for a time, and then sub-
sequently take the case into court, because that would allow him to
select his own time for the court action.2 95 But a denial of the doctrine
211 Oregon Pacific R. R. v. Forrest et al., 128 N. Y. 83, 28 N. E. 137 (1891) ;
Farmers' State Bank v. Day et al., 226 S. W. 595 (Mo. App. 1920) ; Notes (1937)
3 U. oF PiT-. L. REv. 241, (1934) 8 WASH. L. Rav. 140.
292 Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. 73 (1855).
-" De La Cuesta v. Insurance Co. of N. A., 136 Pa. 62, 20 Atl. 505 (1890).
2" Note (1934) 47 HARv. L. Ray. 1413, 1419.
"'Town Council of Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400 (1859) ; New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Lecks, 122 Fla. 127, 165 So. 50 (1936) ; Paulson v. Barger, 132 Iowa
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puts the same power into the hands of the other party, and the claim of
duress frequently arises because the alleged creditor has been canny
enough to time his attack at the strategic moment when the other party
is unable to avail himself of any defense, however meritorious, as for
instance by attachment of an ice company's wagons just as they are
about to start on the daily delivery service.290  A mortgage secured by
threat to sue just when the alleged debtor was fighting off impending
bankruptcy proceedings, was enforced by the Indiana court without any
investigation of the rightfulness of the demand.297 It would be fairer
to both parties to deny either the advantage derived by such inequitable
tactics. In determining whether delay in litigating a dispute should be
allowed, the possible loss of evidence, and the interests of both parties,
not simply of the original claimant, should be consulted.
0. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBLEMS OF EcONOMIc DURESS
AND CONSIDERATION
The problem of economic duress is closely related to that of con-
sideration. Both are concerned with an attack on the motivation lead-
ing to a contract, and it is often difficult to decide whether the attack is
based on the absence of any motivation which the law recognizes as
consideration, or on the presence of that wrongful motivation which the
law calls duress. This confusion is exhibited at several points in the
decisions; one of those leading cases on duress from Michigan, Hackley
v. Headley,29 8 upholding a settlement against the claim of economic
duress, was followed by a new trial and another appeal which, on evi-
dence simply described by the court as "substantially the same," over-
turned the same transaction for lack of consideration; and the lan-
guage used in the latter decision sounds at some points like an approval
of the argument of duress.2 99 So, in a Kansas case, the court agreed the
contract was defective, but split evenly over the question of whether
the defect was duress or lack of consideration.30° Often it makes no
difference in the'rights of the parties which defect is established, though
this would not be true in all cases.3 0'
547, 109 N. W. 1081 (1906) ; see Parker v. Lancaster et aL., 84 Me. 512, 515, 24
Atil. 952 (1892).
... Chandler v. Sanger et aL., 114 Mass. 364 (1874); problem discussed above
p. 351.
"51 Snyder et ux. v. Braden, 58 Ind. 143 (1877).
29845 Mich. 569, 8 N. W. 511 (1881), discussed in Part 1, pp. 256-8.
"9 "All the authorities admit that when one of the parties to a transaction sets
it up against the other as an effective compromise, the latter may hinder it from
operating in that sense and with that force by showing that his opponent acted
unfairly or oppressively and asserted claims which he knew to be void of right
with the design of getting the terms which were nominally assented to." Headley
v. Hackley, 50 Mich. 43. 45, 14 N. W. 693 (1893).
29' Caplice v. Kelley et aL, 27 Kan. 359 (1882).
201 If the attack is on an executory contract, lack of consideration makes the
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In Germany and France, where our doctrine of consideration is
strange, and the courts do concern themselves with the equivalence of
values bargained for in a contract, the law of economic duress has
been recognized and has become "primarily an instrument for insuring a
fair exchange of values in private contracts. '30 2 It may not arouse
much enthusiasm in our Anglo-American courts for the theory of eco-
nomic compulsion to point out that it seems to fit with perfect con-
sistency into the foreign system of contract law where the courts are
not so shocked as are our tribunals at the idea of making contracts for
the parties.
But a little thought suggests that recognition of economic compul-
sion is more essential to our system of contract law than to the European
system. Our idea that individuals must be left to fix the terms of their
own bargains and to exchange a peppercorn for Blackacre if they see
fit to make that sort of an agreement, is defensible, as a means of pro-
moting industry and energy in the people; but if we are to refuse to
inquire into the values agreed to be exchanged, it is all the more im-
portant that we inquire with the utmost care into the pressures that
brought about the agreement. We can justifiably leave the individual
to protect himself from unreasonable terms by refusing to enter into
the contract only if we are sure that he was not subjected to improper
forces when he did contract. In Europe, where contracts which call
.for an exchange of markedly disproportionate values may be interfered
with by the courts for that reason, the law of economic compulsion is,
possibly, not superfluous, but at least simply an additional tool to the
same end. The common law contract for an obviously unequal exchange
procured by wrongful pressure must be enforced unless we either modify
our views on consideration, or else extend the doctrine of duress. There
are indications that some courts are inclined to disregard the "pepper-
corn theory" of consideration 30 3 Many of the cases looking in that
direction could be satisfactorily dealt with as cases of economic duress,
with considerable support in existing precedents. Probably we shall
see further development of the idea of economic duress, and this may
remove the pressure on the old doctrine of consideration; or it may be
contract void (unless there is a consideration-substitute such as promisory estoppel
or a seal) RESTATE ENT, CONTRACts (1932) §19; while duress makes the contract
merely voidable, 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) §1626, save in some
exceptional cases of physical control of the victim, id. at §1624. If the attempt is
to recover money paid, duress is a basis for recovery, but lack of consideration is
immaterial, 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) 367.
.0. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German
Law (1937) 11 Tum. L. Ray. 345, 363.
3 Notes (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1090, (1927) 27 CoL.. L. REv. 430. (1927) 27
COL. L. Ray. 178. See cases discussed above, p. 360.
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that a liberalization of the common law ideas on both subjects is on the
way.
Of late years we have seen freedom of contract severely limited
even in America. Today most of us accept as beneficial or indispensable
many governmental interferences in private contractual transactions
which, fifteen years ago, we would have dismissed from consideration
on the merits simply by labelling them communistic. Leaving aside
the effects of emergency measures, those supposed to be effective during
the war only, we see now price regulations on an increasing list of com-
modities, obligatory collective bargaining, restrictions on unfair labor
practices, wage and hour legislation, compulsory registration of securities
to be sold, and many other limitations on the individual's right to deal
with his neighbor on his own terms. In other words, our legislatures
have seen that
"In law, as in politics, the control of economic power has emerged
as the central problem of modern times. '"304
The extension of the doctrine of duress to cover objectionable economic
pressure is a parallel indication that our courts, or some of them, recog-
nize this same problem. It is not a problem which appears likely to be
solved in our time; but two hundred years of precedents on duress by
non-physical pressure since Astley v. Reynolds have helped toward the
solution. The doctrine is already sufficiently developed so that it can
be an efficient weapon against many economic wrongs; more use, fur-
ther development, and increased effectiveness in the future may be
regarded as inevitable.
04 Dawson, supra note 302, at 345.
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